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ABSTRACT 
 
ETHNO-PLURALISM ANALYSIS IN EUROPEAN UNION: ANALYSIS OF RISE 
OF RIGHT WING PARTIES AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES 
 
 
 
 
AYŞE NAZLI SÖYLET 
M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis, January 2015 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
  
Keywords: Right wing parties, European Elections, Post-industrialism. 
 
For the recent decades, it has been observed that there is an increasing support for 
populist radical right wing parties, which became apparent especially in European 
Elections. This thesis examines the rise of populist radical right wing parties in several 
European countries through taking the 2014 European Elections as its central election 
example while considering two theoretical explanations; Post-industrial Phenomenon 
and Master Frame Theory. In order to create a better understanding on this rise, six 
European countries; Austria, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Greece 
included in this research as example countries. Within these countries, radical right 
parties of each country; Freedom Party of Austria; Front National; Danish People‟s 
Party; Party For Freedom; True Finns and Golden Dawn will beanalyzed through their 
electoral success particularly in the last European Elections of 2014 with a brief 
comparison to previous European elections and national elections in respective 
countries. Theoretical classification of these parties will also be taken place in this 
research in order to prevent a possible conflict due to vast literature on the classification 
in which there are too much definitions and categorization exists.  
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ÖZET 
 
Avrupa Birliği‘nde Etnik Çoğulculuk Analizi: Sağ Partilerin Yükselişi ve Destek 
Gruplarının Analizi  
 
 
 
AYŞE NAZLI SÖYLET 
Avrupa Çalışmaları YüksekLisansProgramı, Tez, Ocak 2015 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
 Anahtar Kelimeler: Sağ partiler, Avrupa Seçimleri, Post-endüstriyel teori 
 
Son yıllarda özellikle Avrupa Seçim‘lerindepopülist radikal sağ partilerin desteğini 
arttırdığı gözlemlenmektedir. Bu araştırmanın temek maksadı; 2014 Avrupa Seçimleri 
sonuçlarını merkeze alarak, popülist radikal sağ partilerin ―post-endüstriyel teori‖ ve 
―potent çerçeve teorisi‖ üzerinden değerlendirilmesini yapmaktır. Son yıllardaki bu 
yükselişi açıklamak üzere altı Avrupa ülkesindeki; Avusturya, Fransa, Danimarka, 
Hollanda, Finlandiya ve Yunanistan‘daki söz konusu sağ partilerin 2014 Avrupa 
Seçimleri sonuçları üzerinden değerlendirilecek, bir önceki Avrupa Seçimleri ile ilgili 
kısa bir karşılaştırma da yer alacaktır. Mevzubahis radikal sağ partilerin teorik olarak 
sınıflandırılması ve açıklaması da olası bir terimsel karışıklığı engellemek maksadıyla 
ayrı bir bölüm olarak incelenecektir.  
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Introduction 
         
 In the most recent elections for the European Parliament in 2014, we witnesseda 
significant rise of populist radical right wing parties across many European countries. 
This rise of Populist Radical Right Parties  (PRRP‟s)1especially in the last several 
decades, might not be considered as the most significantdevelopment in European 
political arenaas this rise has not resulted in determining conclusions for the political 
system. In addition to yet-relative success of these parties in different countries, it is 
observed that there is an open tendency towards underestimation of such electoral 
support and the success ofthese parties particularly in media, since these right wing party 
votes has not reached a critical level that can conclude in disruptive results for European 
political system. Yet,an analysis on recent rise of the populist radical right parties 
implies considerable messages and signs. Although the parties in question have become 
one of the stable features of European political system throughout the history; in which 
they were existent in the European political system for a long time, rise of such votes 
requires a deeper investigation for current period in order to understand the grievances, 
discontentand some structural changes in European societies on one hand. On the other 
hand, a deeper investigation could be useful to understand the lacking efficiency of 
current dominant political parties and deficits in the European political system that 
might also gave boost to the rise of populist radical right wing parties. 
 
 Throughout this thesis, I will try to find a plausible answer to the question of;what 
are the possible reasons behind the rise of populist radical right parties in Europe‟s most 
developed countries?Through asking this question, it is claimed to find reliable answers 
to understand the conditions and developments in European societies and in European 
political arena that give rise to the populist radical right parties and increased their 
electoral support especially in last several years. The „most developed countries‟ phrase 
in the research question especially mentioned here since, the data on the countries that is 
used as empirical means in this research shows that these countries are among the most 
                                                        
1Here, PRRP (populist radical right parties) definition and term taken from Cas Mudde‘s two 
works and will be  in this research within the context that Mudde explain, as it is  explained 
within this thesis.  
Cas Mudde, ―Fighting the System? Populist Radical Right Parties and Party System Change‖, 
Party Politics, 1(10), 2014. pp.2.  
Cas Mudde, ―Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe‖, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
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wealthy ones in Europe with having rather small proportions of economic problems in 
comparison to most of the Southern European countries and rest of the world.  
 
 For the countries that are included in this research, it might be better to observe 
some empirical data at this point in order to understand the emphasis on „developed 
countries‟ as mentioned above. These numbers below are particularly chosen since 
besides the fact that there are several different indicators and categories that could also 
point out a country‟s level of development; most PRRP‟s mentioned in this thesis 
addresses especially these numbers in their elections campaigns and programmes. As of 
2012; net migration rate (migrants/1,000 population)
2
 calculated as 1.79% in Austria; 
that puts the country in 39
th 
place in the world ranking
3
; unemployment rate calculated 
as 4.2% with 106
th
 place in the world ranking and; GDP (per capita in US$) calculated 
as 42,400 for the same year which means that Austria has 19
th
 highest GDP amount in 
world ranking.
4
 For France, net migration rate calculated as 1.1%, which puts France in 
48
th
 place in world ranking; unemployment rate appears as 9.3% that means the country 
is in 96
th
 place in world ranking and GDP (per capita in US$) is 35,600$ that makes the 
France as having 36
th
 highest GDP amount in world ranking.
5
 For Denmark, net 
migration rate appears as 2.36% that puts the country at 31
th
place in world ranking, 
unemployment rate calculated as 6.0% which means Denmark is 139
th
 country in the 
world ranking and GDP (per capitain US$) is 37.600$ in which Denmark appears as the 
                                                        
2Net migration rate gives “the difference between the number 
ofpersonsenteringandleavingthecountryduringtheyear of calculationper 1,000 persons. This rate 
indicatesthecontribution of migrationtotheoveralllevel of populationchange in thesameyear”.  
“Net migration rate”, Indexmundi, 2012. http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=27&l=en 
3World ranking calculated from the highest net migration rate, unemployment rate and GDP (per 
capita) to lowest one in which the ranking of the countries given above in order to see the place 
of countries in question in clearer lenses. 
4For Austrian results of unemployment rate and GDP (per capita) rates:  
“Economy: unemployment rate”, Indexmundi, 2012.http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=74 
“Economy: GDP (per capita in US$)” Indexmundi, 
2012.http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=67&l=en 
5For France results of net migration rate, unemployment rate and GDP rate:  
“Demographics: net migration rate”, Indexmundi, 2012. 
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=27&l=en 
―Economy: unemployment rate”, Indexmundi, 2012. 
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=74 
“Economy: GDP (per capita in US$)” Indexmundi, 2012. 
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=67&l=en 
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30
th
 country in ranking.
6
For Netherlands; net migration rate calculated as 2.02% 
eventually puts the country in 36
th
 place in world ranking, unemployment rate is 4.4% 
(157
th
 place), and GDP (per capitain US$) is 42.700$ in which Netherlands takes the 
18
th
 place in ranking.
7
For Finland; net migration rate is calculated as 0.62% (57
th
place in 
world ranking) which seems quite low; unemployment rate calculated as 7.8% (110
th
 
place in world ranking) and; GDP (per capitain US$) appears as 36.700$ (51th place in 
world ranking).
8
 Greece taken into consideration in this thesis as an exceptional case in 
which the populist right party considered as on more extremist in comparison to other 
parties in question as mostly caused by the financial problems occurred in 2008-2009. 
Therefore therates of unemployment and GDP (per capita) refer to position of Greece 
clearly within this context. Net migration rate calculated as 2.32% for Greece puts the 
country in 57
th
 place in world ranking; unemployment rate is 7.8% (110
th
 place in world 
ranking) which seems quite high in comparison to above-mentioned countries and GDP 
(per capitain US$) is calculated as 26.600$ that seems much lower in comparison to 
other countries in question.
9
These rates are added here as mentioned above; since 
PRRP‟s are always eager to talk particularly about unemployment rates and immigration 
rates and usually built their party programme based on these subjects. These numbers 
are important to see radical right parties‟ amount of politicization of many issues as 
campaign tools; even the indicators are proving a very good performance of a country in 
question, these radical right parties addresses such topics as the biggest of their 
respective country and in fond of exaggerating these topics in order to get higher levels 
of electoral support through boosting the general sensitivity or discontent in respective 
societies.   
 
  The last European Elections of 2014 posited as the central focus point, since it 
shows the latest developments in this subject and relative or complete success of the 
parties in question, consequently remaining debate on radical right will be determined in 
the framework of this election since it is quite not possible to gather all European and 
national election results of the parties within a limited space. Through the chapters of 
this thesis, I claim to shed a light on the re-emergence of these radical parties within the 
                                                        
6
Ibid., 
7
Ibid., 
8
Ibid., 
9
Ibid., 
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context of last European elections, in supposedly different forms as a response to the 
transformations within western societies as a result of changing social, economic and 
political circumstances. This subject is worth to observe and analyze since I humbly 
consider this slowly rising tendency towards PRRP‟s constitute results of a particular 
development in European societies that is generally explained through post-
industrialization phenomenon
10
, which will be examined in further chapters in detail. 
This transformation inmost of the European societies created a tendency towardsin 
society as being anti-immigration, anti- multiculturalism relatedly, and some of other 
anti- positions towards several new conditions that are basically brought by high levels 
of globalization, economic challenges that occurred in last several decades within 
Europe and slowly sharpening identity positions that are becoming more apparent both 
within minority groups and within „native‟ populations.  
 
 Additionally, it is concluded by several academic researches11 that the increasing 
support for PRRP‟s is not only emerging because of the structural transformation that 
European societies had to face with throughout the last few decades let‟s say, it is 
happening also because there also emerged new ways of representation through the vast 
development of communication technologies and branding skills which became 
significant in order to create a sense of change in party positions on many subjects. 
Although this development constitutes a relatively small proportion of the reasoning of 
rise of new challenges from radical parties, there are academics which also will be 
considered in further chapters, that put emphasis on these new opportunities because of 
the fact that without emergence of these new opportunities the rise in question might not 
necessarily experience a visibility at this level.  
 
 It could be also meaningful to add that the last European Elections of 2014 is also 
posited as the central focus point for examination of populist radical right parties since it 
is observed that 2014 elections gained higher relevance in comparison with past 
                                                        
10
For a detailed reading on Post-industrialization phenomenon; Ronald Inglehart, ―Globalization 
and postmodern values‖, The Washington Quarterly. 23(1), 2010, 215-228. 
Piero Ignazi, ―The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypothesis on the emergence of the extreme right-
wing parties in Europe‖, European Journal of Political Research. 22, 1992, 3-34. 
11Jens Rydgren, ―Is extreme Right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the Emergence of new 
party family‖, European Journal of Political Research. 44, 2005, 413-417. 
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European Elections.
12
 Academic and non-academic commentators highlighted this 
higher relevance of last European Elections in most of their comments as a distinctive 
character that emerged in last years. There has been observed a lower turnout for 
European Elections generally in which there is a clear decreasing trend towards the 
event by years. For the last elections of 2014, turnout percentages are emerged as 
significantly similar with previous elections of 2009, which marked a difference, or 
change of attitude towards European Elections in societies. With the facts that will be 
analyzed in detail in further chapters; there might a rather slowly increasing interest 
towards European Elections related with the increasing unrest among European 
societies. This development constitutes another important factor about the inclusion of 
European Elections in this research as a central focusing point.  
 
 Therefore, this thesis is organized in four sections; chapter 1 will provide a brief 
overview on the topic including a literature review and theoretical framework on the 
classification and brief historical development of radical right wing parties in order to 
prevent a possible conflict on the understanding of the term „populist radical right wing 
parties‟ and in order to create a better understanding on, under which circumstances does 
the parties in question developed; chapter two will consider the empirical study on the 
radical right parties through making analysis on six European countries including 
Austria, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Greece with a claim of 
establishing a rather detailed analysis through examining the development of such 
parties in several European countries; chapter three will provide theoretical explanations 
of the rise of populist radical right wing parties in which there will be a brief explanation 
on the two dominant theories; post-industrialization phenomenon and master frame 
theory that are examining the causes and conditions behind the rise of these parties in 
question; and in chapter four will provide an informational section on the last European 
Elections of 2014 which constitutes the ground and a focusing point for this thesis in 
which the election results of the above-mentioned countries gathered around the last 
European Elections through a brief comparison with results of 2009 European Elections 
in order to make it more clear to see the latest performance of these parties in respected 
countries and will include an evaluation of this performance. 
 
                                                        
12Lorenzo De Sio, VincenzoEmanuele&NicolaMaggini, “TheEuropeanParliamentElections of 
2014”. CISE: CentroItalianoStudiElettorali, 2014, 1-329.  
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      CHAPTER 1 
   Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
  
 Aftermath of the Second World War, the existence of extreme right wing parties 
and related phenomena did not constitute a major part or central position in the academic 
debates and politicians although there was happening significant developments on the 
right spectrum of the politics in general.
13
 What was happening especially during 1990‟s 
and aftermath briefly summarized as a period in which liberal democracies enjoying 
significant degree of social and political stability and seems to appeared as the universal 
governmental principle that was practiced by multi- party electoral politics in many 
Western European countries.
14
Extremist solutions represented both by Left and Right 
seemed out of the political agenda through development of sustained economic growth 
and expansion of the welfare state in which individuals enjoyed great degrees of social 
stability relatedly.
15
The development and expansion of liberal democracy as a universal 
form of government and related economic and social progress celebrated as “universal 
victory of democracy”16 as CasMudde puts it however that was an early prediction if one 
could carefully consider the today‟s developments along with the dynamism within right 
side of the political spectrum. Mudde emphasized that new millennium is facing with 
new kinds of developments within the extremism sphere even in the Western European 
countries that are considered as the most democratic systems. The most apparent 
example given in several academic works is the rise of Le Pen‟s Front National in 
France which is still representing a challenge in the French political system although the 
party‟s support could not reach at a level that allow Front National to become a part of 
governing elite.  
 
 Hans- George Betz in his great work on radical right wing populism stated, “the 
optimism had all but evaporated”17 about the new kinds of challenges that are becoming 
                                                        
13Roger Eatwell, CasMudde, ―Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge‖. 
Routlage, 2004.pp.1 
14
Ibid.,pp.i.  
15
Hans- Georg Betz, ―Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe‖.St. Martin‘s Press, 
1994.pp.1.  
16Roger Eatwell, CasMudde, ―Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge‖. 
Routlage, 2004. pp.2.  
17
Hans- Georg Betz, ―Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe‖.St. Martin‘s Press, 
1994.pp.2.  
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even more apparent today.He argues that there emerged major changes within political 
system especially during 1980‟s that brought by social, economic and political 
transformations in society during that period. He emphasized that these new kinds of 
political issues emerged partly as a result of rising new social actors that advocates an 
anti-position against the established political institutions along with increased awareness 
on ecological problems, which created a protest relatedly. Besides, same period 
witnessed a growing demand for social equality, for woman and minority rights in all 
spheres of life. All of these developments expected to be effective especially in the Left, 
which did happened indeed. This progress ended up in growing fragmentation of the 
Left where several kinds of Left-wing parties established like Left- libertarians, Greens 
and others, which were succeeded to create a support behind them. However, the series 
of increasing awareness and demands on several social and political issues also created 
an impact on the developments of the new kinds of Right-wing parties especially after 
1990‟s. Betz call them as radical Right in this context, and argues that these radical 
Right parties also succeeded to re-emerge in supposedly different sets of agendas during 
1990‟s.18 
 
 About the development of radical Right parties and their continued progress for 20 
years at least, Roger Eatwellstates that there are several significant aspectsthat should be 
taken into considerationabout the rise of PRRP‟s which might be causes of growing 
concern. First, even though there is a tendency towards exaggerating the increasing 
support behind PRRP‟s, it is also apparent that there is an actual increase in the support 
for such parties in many countries in Europe whether it is a slow increase in numbers or 
not. On one hand he argues that the electoral support for PRRP‟s seems volatile in many 
cases, which support might emerged and risen as a result of some issue-based grievances 
thus, this increase might not conclude in a total success of such parties. On the other 
hand, he also argues that there is a general consensus that this rising support for PRRP‟s 
cannot be simply underestimated as a form of protest vote since there are growing 
awareness and discomfort among European societies on the issues of immigration and 
law and order especially, which are strongly promoted by radical right parties that could 
turn into a loyal electoral basis.
19
Secondly, he argues that there is a recent trend of 
                                                        
18
Ibid., pp.3. 
19Roger Eatwell, CasMudde, ―Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge‖. 
Routlage, 2004.pp.1. 
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practicing violent expressions towards ethnic and religious minorities in European 
societies, Muslim groups in particular, becoming a scapegoat for rising grievances. 
Although this trend arisen as two folded development; both promoted from widespread 
fundamentalist approaches among religious minorities and from „native‟ population who 
have already feel a discomfort about such groups, this violent trend might end up in 
supporting radical Right who would not refuse an appeal like this for practical reasons 
such as vote maximizing claim.
20
 
 
 According to Eatwell‟s argument, the developments among ethnic minorities in 
European societies should also be taken into consideration while making an analysis on 
this topic. He states that there is an increasing tendency towards expressing identity 
issues while becoming more aware of this identity feeling among minorities mostly as a 
result of staying as „aliens‟ on the edges of societies and political systems in 
question.
21
This alienation might result in deepening problems within society and in 
political system relatedly. Radical Right wing parties inclined to seek some opportunity 
from such situations. In today‟s political context, due to the fact that they cannot 
represent themselves as openly racist parties, they are representing such affiliations 
through softer terms like being anti-immigrant party, which is not asserting a racist 
propaganda against minorities but defending the cultural unity of „native‟ populations in 
the countries in question. Consequently, the populations who are already feeling a 
discomfort about minorities and variety of groups would turn their faces to PRRP‟s in 
elections. Lastly, there is also a current debate on the future of democracy and this 
debate has some aspects that can be linked to the rise of PRRP‟s. Although majority of 
the voters does not constitute an anti-position against democracy and democratic ideals, 
there is a distrust and antipathy for established parties and politicians who were once 
responsible from well-being of populations but could not take necessary steps for the 
newly emerged and developed problems such as increasing levels of immigration and 
crime rates. Within these circumstances, populations might find PRRP‟s more reliable 
where they represent themselves as the true representatives of the „people‟ in response to 
above-mentioned distrust for established political organizations.
22
 
                                                        
20
Ibid.,pp.2. 
21
Ibid.,pp.2. 
22Margaret Canovan, ―Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy‖, Political 
Studies.47,1999, 2-16. 
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1.1. Theoretical Explorations On Classification of Radical Right Wing Parties 
 
 On the classification of right wing parties, it could be found a broad literature for 
this subject. Although these parties in question once determined within the right wing 
party family, there are significant differences both between these parties and terms that 
are used in order to characterize them (i.e. extreme, populist and radical in particular).
23
 
Many academic researches agreed to state that there is no such consensus on the 
classification especially for the ones that re-emerged in last decades since it could be 
mistaken to put them under one classification as extreme or populist simply because; 
they have some characteristics that could fit with a combination of these radical, extreme 
or populist terms. It could be possible to talk about a more common approach on the 
classification of these parties, which draws a distinction between „new extreme right‟ or 
„radical right‟ and „old‟ ones.24Relatedly, Cas Mudde emphasized that there are more 
than 26 different kinds of definitions in this classification terminology in order to 
describe right-wing extremist ideology that were collected.
25
Therefore, in this thesis I 
decided to call them as Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP‟s) as Cas Mudde puts26 
because variety of reasons that will also be explained. Therefore in this section, I will try 
to elaborate on classification on PRRP‟s through explaining different definitions.  
 
 About the classification of political parties, there are few more points worth to 
mention. The essential claim on the classification is to create a broader sense of 
definition for the parties that could be gathered into one group through determining 
some of the important characteristics of such groups that parties share in common. 
                                                        
23
 It is also observed that the terms extreme and radical for these parties used interchangeably 
especially by newspaper clippings and by academic works although there are differences 
between two terms theoretically.  
24Piero Ignazi, ―The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypothesis on the emergence of the extreme 
right-wing parties in Europe‖, European Journal of Political Research. 22, 1992, 3-34,Herbert 
Kitschelt, A.J. McGann, ―The Radical Right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis‖. 
University of Michigan Press, 1995. 
25
Cas Mudde, Right-wing extremism analyzed: A comparative analysis of the ideologies of three 
alleged right-wing extremist parties (NPD, NDP, CP‘86)‖. European Journal of Political 
Research, 27, 1995, 203-224. 
Cas Mudde, ―The war of words defining the extreme right party family‖. West European 
Politics, 9(2), 1996, 224-248. 
26Cas Mudde, ―Fighting the System? Populist Radical Right Parties and Party System Change‖, 
Party Politics, 1(10), 2014.pp.2. 
10 
 
Which means, study of political parties primarily takes a group of parties as a larger 
group (i.e. right-wing parties), or focuses on a smaller group within the larger group (i.e. 
extremist right wing political parties). In which, a consensus on a dominant perspective 
on the studies of political parties did not emerge so far.
27
Besides, this attempt to put 
parties in a group which is called party families basically created on the basis of party 
ideologies in which parties are differentiated and classified according to their 
ideologies.
28
I would like to add my humble opinions at this point. Although party 
families once created on the basis of ideologies of such establishments, in the current 
context, salience of „the ideology‟ decreased at remarkable levels. Of course, while 
examining the political parties which once constructed through the influence of 
ideologies, one must take the historical linkage between parties and their roots into 
consideration however, in today‟s fashion, several remarkable developments that 
emerged as a transformation in social structure and political arena relatedly, created an 
impact on the construction of political parties. There are many scholarly works 
dedicated to understand how these developments in social structure reflected in the 
political arena and changed the political parties and their both rhetoric and programmes, 
which will be analyzed in further chapters. Therefore, an analysis or classification of 
political parties according to their basic core values, which refers mainly to their 
ideologies, is no longer applicable in order to understand whole picture about the parties 
in question. 
  
 First of all, it should be mentioned that the parties in question sometimes classified 
as extreme not just because of their historical roots which refers to fascist affiliations, 
but because they stand on the margins of political system. However, in order to prevent 
a possible conflict on the terminology, it must be underlined that one should prefer to 
use „marginal‟ instead of „extreme‟. At this point, it must be also underlined that the 
parties in question lost their marginal character since their position in the political 
system became mainstream as they started to seek for maximizing their votes as much as 
possible through insisting upon their agendas.
29
 Therefore, they started to considered as 
                                                        
27William Crotty, ―The Theory and Practice of Political Science‖. Northwestern University 
Press,1991. pp.145. 
28Cas Mudde, ―The Ideology of the Extreme Right‖, Manchester University Press,2000. pp.3. 
29
 Susi Meret, ―The Danish People‘s Party, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian 
Freedom Party in a Comparative Perspective: Party Ideology and Electoral Support‖, 
2010,Institut for Historie, Internationale Studier ogSamfundsforhold, 2010. pp.24 
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mainstream parties already by many academic resources in which their radical or 
extreme features does not constitute an exclusive characteristic which puts them on the 
margins of political system. On the issue of making discrimination between radical and 
extreme features, there are a few important points to mention. On one hand, in some of 
the academic researches, the extreme characteristic associated with studies of fascism, 
which is no longer relevant for the parties that are in consideration since, this „extreme‟ 
term basically refers to the refusal of parliamentary system and anti-Semitic stance in 
classical literature on this subject.
30 On the other hand, in today‟s terminology the 
extreme right became a commonly preferred term in order to describe parties such as 
Front National, with a different kind of motivation. Within this context the major 
characteristics of „recent‟ extreme right are; their anti-democracy stance, strong state 
emphasis, racism
31
 and nationalism.
32
 
  
 There is another definition that preferred by scholars in order to describe the 
parties in question which is „anti-immigration parties‟ in which these parties are 
considered as single-issue establishments. Therefore, advocates of this definition 
interpret the increase in support for such parties as increasing importance of issue voting 
which is mainly related to rising significance of immigration issue. However, the parties 
in question are not necessarily fit with major characteristics of single-issue parties. 
Single-issue parties are taking their support from an electorate that is not belonging to a 
certain social structure; single-issue parties generally supported by its electorate on the 
basis of a single issue; they do not necessarily have a stable ideological programme and 
they underline only one all-encompassing issue.
33
 Therefore, it would be mistaken to 
classify all PRRP‟s, which are predominantly raised in recent decades, as single-issue 
parties since these establishments are not founded or developed on the basis of such 
characteristics that mentioned above. Although they generally benefitted from raising 
importance of issue voting, mostly for the issues of immigration and law and order, they 
                                                        
30Piero Ignazi, ―The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypothesis on the emergence of the extreme 
right-wing parties in Europe‖, European Journal of Political Research. 22, 1992, 3-34. 
31
 In this context racism does not necessarily refers to the ethnic racism in classical 
understanding, but rather emerges in the shape of ethno-pluralism, which mainly constructed 
upon cultural discrimination.  
32Roger Eatwell, Cas Mudde, ―Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge‖. 
Routlage, 2004. pp.8.  
33Cas Mudde, ―The single issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the immigration issue‖. 
West European Politics, 22(3), 1999. pp.184.  
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do have an ideological programme in general and they do not structure their agenda as 
all-encompassing.  
 
 A vast terminological debate maintained by Mudde‟s several works on this subject 
yet of course, he is not the only one who took these parties into consideration. It is stated 
above that his term; populist radical right parties (PRRP‟S) will take place in this thesis 
in order to make a generalization for all parties in question since I humbly decided that 
this term might partly reflect all of the characteristics of such parties in relevance with 
today‟s circumstances. His terminology sounded important and relevant for several 
accounts. In his own article on PRRP‟s, Mudde states that these parties are sharing a 
core ideology that is including; nativism, authoritarianism and populism. By nativism he 
refers that there is xenophobia element as a form of nationalism in these party 
programmes, that advocates a single culture within a nation state is the ideal form of 
unity in which non-native cultures considered as a threat. By authoritarianism he states 
that these parties hold a strong belief in law and order which would provide the 
discipline in society through strict enforcement of such laws. And by populism, he 
argues that the parties in question have a perspective that divides society into two 
homogenous groups; the corrupt elite and the pure people, who are in constant conflict 
in which this conflict must be fixed through making the „general will‟ of the people as 
the main source of motivation.
34
 In Pedahzur and Perliger‟s work on this subject; 
defining the boundaries of party families; they also refer to Mudde‟s earlier work35 in 
which he wrote about broader characteristics of the new radical right parties. These 
characteristics are basically; xenophobia, traditional ethics, nationalism, extremism, 
welfare chauvinism and an emphasis of strong state. Authors, the authors underlines that 
all of these features not necessarily appears at the same time in equal importance on 
party programmes however, they are all significant features while defining such parties 
if they appear.
36
 
 
 In this literature, it is also stated that PRRP‟s could be considered as anti-system 
                                                        
34Cas Mudde, ―Fighting the System? Populist Radical Right Parties and Party System Change‖, 
Party Politics, 1(10), 2014. pp.2. 
35
Ami Pedahzur&AriePerliger, ―An AlternativeApproachforDefiningtheBoundaries of 
‗PartyFamilies‘: ExamplesfromtheIsraeli Extreme Right- WingPartyScene‖. AustralianJournal 
of PoliticalScience, 39(2),2004, 285-305 in Cas Mudde, ―The Ideology of the Extreme Right‖, 
Manchester University Press,2000. pp.3. 
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particularly if their position lean towards extremist (in traditional terms) ideals. This 
anti-system position defined clearly in Sartori‟s work in which the author points out that 
in order to call a party as anti-system, this party in question must undermine the 
legitimacy of the regime that it opposes.
37
 With respect to author‟s argument, PRRP‟s 
could not be called as anti-system parties since they are not undermining the legitimacy 
of democracy in most cases. However, it is also possible to put these parties under anti-
system category just because they are generally position themselves against some key 
characteristics of liberal democracy such as minority rights and pluralism.
38
Therefore, at 
this point, one can classify PRRP‟s under anti-system title through bearing their 
opposition to fundamental elements of liberal democracy in mind.  
 
 While making an analysis on classification of the parties in question, it is also 
important to mention that, major academic works on this subject
39
 makes a distinction 
between traditional extreme right parties and new extreme right parties that are marked 
and partly shaped by postindustrial societies which is why Ignazi named them as new 
post-industrial extreme right parties.
40
The major difference between new postindustrial 
extreme right parties and traditional ones has emerged in relation to remarkable 
structural social and political changes in many Western societies, which were mainly 
brought by globalization as well as advanced industrial developments.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
37
Giovanni Sartori, ―Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis‖. Cambridge University 
Press, 1976.pp.133.  
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            CHAPTER 2 
  An Empirical Study of the Right Wing parties across Europe  
 
 In this chapter there will be an attempt to examination and empirical study of six 
countries with their related populist radical right wing parties as mentioned before. FPÖ 
(Freedom Party of Austria) in Austria, FN (Front National) in France, DPP (Danish 
People‟s Party) in Denmark, PVV (Party for Freedom) in the Netherlands, PS (True 
Finns) in Finland and XA (Golden Down) in Greece will be posited in the further 
sections in order to make an even more detailed analysis on different kinds of parties 
that are considered in the populist radical right parties group. These countries and their 
respective PRRP‟s are particularly included in this work both because of their 
similarities and differences. Freedom Party of Austria, Front National and Danish 
People‟s Party considered being as the most settled and similar ones in which they 
constitute classical examples of populist radical right wing parties thus, they has to be 
mentioned in this work as the oldest ones. Party for Freedom in Netherlands, as being in 
the same category appears mostly because of its anti- Islam and anti- immigrant 
position, which are the party‟s distinctive characteristics, affiliated with its radical 
stance. True Finns included in this research because of its unexpected success in both 
European and national elections. For the case of Golden Dawn, both party‟s extreme 
radical ideology and Greece‟s distinctive condition attracted scholarly research; within 
this context Golden Dawn could be considered as the most extremist example in populist 
radical right wing parties.   
 
2.1. Austria: Freedom Party of Austria  
 
 In the last European elections, Austria became one of the EU countries that has 
encountered with rise of populist radical right-wing party; FPÖ (Freiheitlichen Partei 
Österreichs)41 Freedom Party of Austria, increased its votes by 7.01 per cent from the 
previous elections and took the third place in national results. For the last European 
elections of 2014, FPÖ succeeded to gain 19.72% of the votes with a 7.01% increase in 
which they were able to gain 12.71% of the votes as a result of 2009 European 
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 ―Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs‖, FPÖ, 2014.  
http://www.fpoe.at/dafuer-stehen-wir/leitantrag/ 
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Elections.
42
Before making an analysis on FPÖ‟s campaign discourse, and fundamental 
electoral basis, it seems necessary to put some brief information on Austrian national 
politics and dominant parties within a broader perspective of Austrian politics in order to 
understand FPÖ‟s position in national level with clearer lenses. Thereafter, more 
detailed discussion on FPÖ‟s position in political party classification, party discourse 
along with its historical roots and reasons behind its increased vote share will be 
emphasized as following parts. For the current discussion on FPÖ‟s position in national 
political system, „popular radical right wing‟ term will be used in this context as 
mentioned at the beginning chapters of this thesis.  
 
 Austrian politics constructed and defined as stable two- party system. Major 
political parties in Austria SPÖ and ÖVP especially between 1945- 1990were able to 
remain in power interchangeably and also established successful coalitions. SPÖ 
(SozialdemokratischeParteiÖsterreichs)43 Social Democratic Party of Austria positioned 
as the major left political party in the country and ÖVP (ÖsterreichischeVolkspartei)44 
Austrian People‟s Party positioned as major conservative political party; which are also 
forming the current grand coalition government as the result of 2013 national elections 
in Austria.
45
 At the same elections FPÖ emerged as the third major political party in 
country while increasing its vote by 2.97 per cent and gained 20.5% of the votes.  
 
 FPÖ is the political establishment founded in 1956 that hasstrong nationalist 
affiliations whose first leader was an Austrian Nazi leader. During the leadership of Jörg 
Heider, FPÖ gained significant support from several different groups in society and 
increased its popularity among Austrian people. The highest electoral success came in 
1999 for FPÖ in which party gained 26.91% of the votes and became second party in the 
country ranking. At the same election ÖVP came first out of ballot box and gained 
33.15% of the votes. At the beginning of February in 2000, ÖVP and FPÖ formed a 
coalition consequently.
46
During these years, leader of the FPÖ, Jörg Heider considered 
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 ―European Parliament Results of the 2014 European election‖, European Parliament, 2014. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-at-2014.html 
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 ―Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs‖, SPÖ, 2014. http://spoe.at/ 
44
 ―Özterreichische Volkspartei‖, ÖVP, 2014. http://www.oevp.at/Home.psp 
45
 ―Bundesministerium Für Inners‖, BM.I. http://wahl13.bmi.gv.at/ 
46―Austria: Parliamentary Chamber: Nationalrat Elections held in 1999‖, IPU, 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2017_99.html 
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as an extremist right- wing politician as an opinion poll indicated.
47
Along with 
Heider‟ssympathy for extremist policies, party rhetoricin 1999 election campaign 
period,could be considered as a clear sign of party‟s core values and its basic 
characteristics. Heider underlined anti- foreigner stance of the party for many cases 
during the campaign period through offering a policy that suggests freezing immigration 
to Austria along withinitiating campaigns, whichwere emerging as an oppositionagainst 
furtherenlargement of European Union.
48
 In the same election period, FPÖ also put a 
remarkable emphasis on family, which is defined as the nucleusof Austrian society and 
proposed a new policy, which wouldincrease state aid for families. Although current 
discourse that FPÖ politicians prefer seems softened and transformed into a more 
plausible rhetoric, this transformation could be considered as a re-shaping of the 
wording just because; a general change in the party discourse did not emerged as a result 
of a real transformation in the party politics.  
 
 It is stated that FPÖ became the winner of 1999 Austrian national elections since 
the party adopted anti-immigration campaigns successfully.
49
 FPÖ‟s success at adopting 
and advocating anti-immigration policies while having a clear stance against this 
particular issue still constitutes one of the important reasons behind its support. In 2002 
elections, FPÖ had to face with dramatic electoral failure since the party could not use 
its influential position in parliament effectivelyas a partner of government, and could not 
be able to take enough responsibility and could not be able to spend the necessary effort 
about its pre- election promises during this time period.
50
It is also mentioned that the 
failure came after the party‟s governing period emerged partly as a result of intra-party 
conflicts along with its ineffective use of its position.  
 
 In latest European elections, FPÖ‟s enjoyed electoral success in comparison to its 
earlier results, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The current party leader is 
Heinz Christian Strache who came to the leadership position in 2005. On one hand, it is 
stated that some of the ideological expressions has replaced by him with softer versions 
                                                        
47Zöchling Christa, Haider: Licht und SchatteneinerKarriere(Wien: MoldenVerlag 1999) 
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while many essential statements remain very similar to previous ones.
51
 On the other 
hand, it is also emphasized by academic commentators that under leadership of Strache, 
party added more radical right perspective to its campaigns especially on immigration, 
integration of foreigners and multi- culturalism issues.
52
 According to Phillip Decker‟s 
analysis on FPÖ, party leadership “combined its anti- establishment discourse with a 
critique of the current economic system identified with European Union”.53 Within this 
analysis, Decker points out that the party‟s classification as radical right appears as a 
result of FPÖ‟s anti- immigrant, anti- Islam, anti- Semitic language which forms the 
ideological core of the party. As mentioned above, the basis of FPÖ‟s ideological core 
founded especially on German nationalism ideals, which turned into exclusionary 
nationalism eventually continues with advocating polarization of society on the basis of 
„othering‟ the foreigners in the country. Conceptualization of the „other‟ emerges 
through the critics on the basis of ethnicity and religion constituted by FPÖ.54There are 
also several comments thatagree with above-mentionedanalysis, and states that FPÖ 
strongly polarize public opinion, as the other successful right- wing populist parties.  
 
 FPÖ‟s 2014 election campaign discourse predominantlyembraced immigration, 
asylum and integration subjects as central topics while adopting intense anti- feelings 
against non-European immigrants.  During election campaign period, party politicians 
mainly asserted that there should be stricter laws and policies on immigration and 
asylum thus, there must be taken stricter measures against the threat of Islam. FPÖ also 
accusing two dominant parties; ÖVP and SPÖ for not preventing the flow of immigrants 
into the country and letting more foreigners to come in to Austria which will seize 
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Austrian jobs and will damage the educational system.
55
 In the FPÖ‟s party program, it 
can be clearly observed that there is a strong emphasis on cultural origins of Austrians as 
a part of cultural region of Europe. Over and above it is clearly stated that European 
culture predominantly shaped by Christianity with influence of Judaism.
56
 On the basis 
of this observation, FPÖ‟s oppositional stance against Islam become evident along with 
party‟s election statements which were blaming Islam as not being a natural part of 
European Judeo- Christian cultural values. 
 
 Classification of Austrian Freedom Party as right- wing Populist Party altered by 
newspaper clippings, which are also important to take into consideration in order to 
understand the party‟s influence both on media and on the eyes of population through 
media representation. Time magazine called FPÖ as “far- right party” in its; “March of 
the Far Right in Austria” headline, along with party leader Strache‟s statement about 
women in burqas as “female ninjas”. 57  In addition to party leader‟s statement 
particularly on Muslim woman, this clipping also puts emphasis on Strache‟s 
expressions on European economic problems in which he promises to “cut off the funds 
for bankrupt EU countries”. Time magazine is not the only one who called FPÖ as far- 
right political party. In relation to this classification, there are several newspapers that 
called FPÖ as far- right party while explaining its electoral success in 2014 European 
elections.
58
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According to opinion polls as mentioned in an analysis on FPÖ, %32 of the 
voters under age of 29supported FPÖ in Austria.59 Driving from this fact, newspaper 
commentators, suggests a deeper analysis on these votes especially coming from 
younger generations in order for a better understanding of growing discontent among 
young population. Le Monde news agencycallsFPÖ‟s increasing votes as pushing of the 
far right in Austria with the headline of “Fears of Growing Protest Vote”60 in which the 
newspaper highlights FPÖ‟s discourse on rejection of „Brussels‟ as an electoral 
campaign. The news agency underlined the opinions of a political scientist, Dominique 
Reyni in which he explains this rise of far right votes as; “European Parliament have 
traditionally favored marginal parties, they are characterized by proportional 
representation and high level of abstention especially among moderate votes”. In 
relation with Le Monde‟s description of such support as „protest vote‟ an analysis on 
Policy Network site also defines support for FPÖ as a rising of protest votes and 
attempts to explain this support. Analysis argues FPÖ give voice to most popular and 
debated topics for population such as immigration, crime rates accordingly, loss of 
national identity and future dangers that immigration might bring. Besides, FPÖ 
suggested a creation of preferential treatment for Austrian workers.
61
As analysis 
concludes, rise of vote for FPÖ should be considered as a reflection of general 
opposition and discontent in population for above-mentioned subjects that boosts the 
feelings of fear and discontent among people.  
 
There are also other comments in the same analysis about the support for FPÖ. 
In this brief analysis, author lay stress on the young voters who supported FPÖ in last 
European elections and creates a link between dissatisfied young population who feels 
that they are abandoned or underrepresented by mainstream parties or political system in 
general, and who are also feel uneasy about doubtful future developments that might 
                                                        
59Thomas Baumgartner, ―Austria and the European elections: Why so many young voters are so 
keen on the FPÖ‖, FUTURELABEUROPE, 21 May 2014. 
http://www.futurelabeurope.eu/blog/austria-and-the-european-elections-why-so-many-young-
voters-are-so-keen-on-the-fpo/,  Markus Salzmann, ―Austria: Far-right FPÖ gains support in 
Austria: European elections‖,World Socialist Web Site, 4 June 2014. 
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/06/04/aust-j04.html 
60
Alain Salles, ―Fears of growing protest vote‖, Le Monde, 7 October 2013. 
http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/article/4201931-fears-growing-protest-vote 
61
 Sylvia Kritzinger, ―Austria: What contributed to the FPÖ‘s protest vote‖,Policy Network, 27 
May 2014. http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4654&title=Austria-What-
contributed-to-the-FP%C3%96s-protest-vote 
20 
 
happen as a result of high flows of immigration and free movement of workers for this 
case. FPÖ successfully presented itself as the defender of young people and concerned 
population against “them at the top” as the author states. 62 According to this brief 
analysis, there emerged a common opinion on increased votes of FPÖ in which authors 
draw attention especially to young voters whose support for FPÖ considered as a protest 
vote as a result of above-mentioned factors. As opposition to this common opinion about 
vote of protest there is also an analysis that is arguing increasing electoral support for 
FPÖ should not be perceived as protest vote. As Policy network analysis indicates, 
increasing vote for right- wing parties as in the example of FPÖ called as protest votes 
since many corruption scandals about grand coalition in country uncovered especially by 
Greens in Austria. Yet, author states that these corruption scandals cannot be the major 
reason of this support for FPÖ since the party “is probably the most corrupt party of all”. 
Therefore, analysis argues that it was not a vote of protest but it was  “vote of 
fear”.63FPÖ campaigns during the election period gave rise to such slogans as “the lazy 
southern Europeans” which was a reference Eurozone crisis that also emerged as a 
common campaign slogan for all of the populist parties. Another newspaper clipping 
from FT news agency refers to Strache‟s talk in which he triggers the crowd‟s unease 
about economic concerns and immigrants. Strache blames the grand coalition for not 
taking serious precautions against economic crisis. At the same pubic talk, Strache also 
shows a clear hostility towards immigration while especially addressing Turkish 
immigrants he states that; “If there are immigrants, from Turkey, who complain there is 
a cross hanging in the classroom at school, then I say to them „go back home”.64 
 
For a better understanding of Austrian Freedom Party agenda and about their 
own stances on certain subjects, it could be useful to point out a couple of statements 
from the party programme in accordance with discussions above. In the first part of the 
party programme, FPÖ puts strong emphasis on the history of Austria and origins of 
                                                        
62Thomas Baumgartner, ―Austria and the European elections: Why so many young voters are so 
keen on the FPÖ‖, FUTURELABEUROPE, 21 May 2014. 
http://www.futurelabeurope.eu/blog/austria-and-the-european-elections-why-so-many-young-
voters-are-so-keen-on-the-fpo/ 
63
Sylvia Kritzinger, ―Austria: What contributed to the FPÖ‘s protest vote‖,Policy Network, 27 
May 2014. http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=4654&title=Austria-What-
contributed-to-the-FP%C3%96s-protest-vote 
64James Shotter, ―Far-right Freedom party exploits Austrian unease‖, FT, 20 May 
2014.http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b14024be-d692-11e3-b251-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Lb8bfAQd 
21 
 
Austrian people, which appears as a common feature of the discourse of most far right 
parties.
65
 Under the Liberal Policy Guidelines title, the second article it is clearly stated 
that Austrian Freedom Party is committed to protect Austrian national identity along 
with protection of homeland and autonomy of Austria.
66
 On one hand, these statements 
could be considered as an eventual result and natural expression of being on the right 
side of the political spectrum. On the other hand, party programme includes stronger 
expressions in further parts on the issue of diversity and multi-culturalism. 
Consequently, the articles that addressed above should be taken into consideration in 
relation with latter articles that will be mentioned as following, along with Strache‟s 
discourse and party campaigns during the election period.  
 
On the chapter of Europe of Diversity in the party programme, it is stated in the 
first paragraph that; Austrian Freedom Party “firmly reject any artificial synchronization 
of the diverse European languages and cultures by means of forced multiculturalism and 
globalization and mass immigration. Europe shall not be reduced to a political project of 
the European Union.
67
Through this expression, party position on issues of 
multiculturalism, immigration and “artificial synchronization of European languages” 
becomes clearer. It can be argued that, FPÖ adopted an ideology in which even free 
movement of European citizens and immigration of „foreigners‟ shall not be tolerated as 
the natural outcome of globalized world. It is also possible to talk about an oppositional 
mindset towards European Union as a broader composition including high levels of 
multiculturalism. At this point, it can be stated that the party programme is not drawing 
a clearly defined framework or oppositional position against European Union project yet 
while arguing lacking of a clear stance against EU, nationalist position of FPÖ and 
nationalist discourse of party leader should be kept in mind in order to have a better 
perspective about party‟s possible tendency on such topics.  
 
                                                        
65
This emphasis on cultural origins of the nation- state in question emerges as a common 
characteristic among most of the PRRP‘s that take place both in their discourse and party 
programme predominantly. The cultural emphasis considered as the major value of ethno 
plurality phenomenon which PRRP‘s advocates in most of the cases. 
66―Program of the Austrian Freedom Party‖, FPÖ, 30 October 1997. 
http://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/Contentpool/Portal/PDFs/Parteiprogramme/Parteiprogram_eng.pdf 
67―Program of the Austrian Freedom Party‖, FPÖ, 30 October 
1997.http://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/Contentpool/Portal/PDFs/Parteiprogramme/Parteiprogram_e
ng.pdf 
 
22 
 
2.2. France: National Front  
 
For the last European elections, results from France became one of the most 
debated topics among the election news. National Front (FN) gained 24% of the vote 
share and took the first place in France
68
 while the current strongest and moderate 
parties of France; UMP (Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire) and PS (Parti Socialiste) 
faced with substantial decrease of votes.
69
Besides, in comparison to previous European 
elections in 2009 in which National Front gained only 6% of the vote share, 2014 
elections appears as even more significant.
70
 Depending upon such statistics, this 
absolute victory of FN emerged as a remarkable outcome for several accounts.  
 
First of all, 2014 European Elections is the first time that National Front could be 
able to reach this much of vote share since its formation, which eventually constitutes 
FN‟s first time of being the largest party of all in national level. 71 Besides, FN is 
considered as the largest extreme-right party in Europe while holding strong 
oppositional position against European Union, also commonly known as Eurosceptic. 
Through this considerable increase of its vote share, FN has high possibility to push for 
an expansion of other right- wing Eurosceptic parties of Europe as having a lauder voice 
among them. Besides the fact that the last European election results created a change in 
balance on the right side of politics in France as a consequence of FN‟s higher vote 
share in comparison to UMP
72
, FN‟s voter profile has also shows an important change in 
which National Front could be able to gain the voter groups that are generally associated 
with left-wing political parties. According to IPSOS researches on voter profile for the 
last European Elections, FN supported mostly by manual workers with 43% percentage, 
also supported by; 38% of the low-skilled non-manual employees, 37% of the 
unemployed voters and 30% of the low-income households.
73
 Additionally, FN has a 
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voter profile constituted by mostly a young electorate group who are under 35 years 
according to researches.
74
 
 
Along with these aspects mentioned above, the change in FN‟s party profile, 
leader and discourse should be also noted under this topic. Academic and non-academic 
resources highlighted the general change in party‟s stance on several issues especially on 
immigration, which helped the rise in FN‟s support as mentioned. Yet, the change in the 
discourse or party program is still open to debate, as it could not convince academics 
that Marine Le Pen softened such policies.
75
Although there is a current consensus on Le 
Pen‟s efforts to bring a wave of reform especially to party discourse, most commentators 
refer to use “re-branding” concept in order to explain the changes that FN underwent 
which might not enough to claim a fundamental change in party program.
76
 
 
              Academic and non- academic commentators made a significant effort to 
analyze such outcome in order to reveal the impetus behind FN‟s support, party‟s 
increasing success for last several elections both on national and European level, and 
tried to find out what might be the further possibilities of this outcome. Along with a 
deeper examination on FN‟s electoral success and European election victory, it is also 
important to put some emphasis on party‟s general portrait, party affiliations, current 
party program, political discourse and campaigns that party leader initiate since FN 
stands as a prime example of extreme right party family in western European political 
system.
77
 Although some of the newspapers and magazines call FN as far right political 
party
78
, according to academic and non- academic resources, there is also a consensus on 
the classification of National Front as extreme right political party, which seems more 
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relevant within the current context. A debate over classification of FN through a 
theoretical perspective will take place after brief information on party‟s general portrait 
and development of its current rhetoric.  
 
While examining on FN‟s last election victory, it must be kept in mind that 
leader change happened in 2011 and election of Marine Le Pen as the new leader played 
significant role on Front National‟s success as scholars indicates. Marine Le Pen took 
her father‟s place as new leader during 2011, which drew the attention of many 
newspapers along with her declarations. BBC News, while classifying FN as „far right 
party‟ cites Le Pen‟s words after her election in which she explained that there is a need 
for a change in the party image and position and also she claims that they seek for a 
break with former image of FN as xenophobic, anti- Islam and anti- immigration party. 
She also mentioned that through such changes they claim to be a mainstream party 
rather than staying as extreme.
79
Another clipping from The New York Times represents 
Marine Le Pen as having a softer image in contrast with her father Jean- Marie Le Pen, 
and portrays her as a person who is difficult to dislike. According to this interview with 
Marine Le Pen, she has ideas about immigration policies in parallel with her father‟s 
however; she is successful at framing these ideas within a softer image, which also 
underpins FN‟s popularity among younger generation.80About the leader change and 
change in the discourse, New York Times refers to director of French Polling Agency, 
F. Micheau in which he portrayed that FN‟s supposedly new image as “something 
totally new” in FN‟s history. Besides, newspaper clipping touches upon Le Pen‟s 
statement on immigration that she conceptualizes party program on immigration not as 
“xenophobic but rather commonsensical” whereas only two years after her election to 
party leadership, her claims on changing party‟s xenophobic, anti-Islam image seems 
failed after her comments on Muslim prayers as The Telegraph and Daily Mail states. 
According to clipping from The Telegraph, she compared Islamic prayers in the street 
with Nazi occupation through mentioning that Muslim Prayers are “occupation of 
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territory”.81 The Guardian shared the same news asserting that Le Pen expressed “so 
let‟s talk about occupation because that‟s what happening here” while mentioning 
Muslim prayers in the street.
82
 
 
 While examining about FN‟s latest victory, Marine Le Pen‟s attempt to change 
the image of the party must be analyzed within a deeper perspective. From a classical 
point of view on political party classification, former profile of FN could be defined as 
“anti-system” as Sartori puts in which he refers a party as anti-system when the party in 
question “undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes”.83However, under current 
circumstances, FN‟s position might not fit into such definition. As it mentioned, many 
commentators agreed that Marine Le Pen attempt to create a shift in party‟s position 
from being an anti-system party to a mainstream party which would adopt an agenda 
claims to maximize its votes.
84
Since former rhetoric and party program was under the 
leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen was even more extremist especially on immigration 
topics. During the 1990‟s party program was based on extreme radical propositions such 
as deporting three million non-European immigrants, reintroduction of death penalty, 
and suggestion of restriction of the nationality principle to blood right.
85
 Until the year 
of 2002, party program and leader‟s rhetoric remain basically the same with its extremist 
policy ideals. In 2002, presidential election has taken place in France in which Jean- 
Marie Le Pen was a candidate for presidency. Apart from the fact that Jean Marie Le-
Pen‟s success at first round of election which he gained about 17.02% of the votes, that 
puts him in the second place in the runoff elections as a second round, Jacques Chirac 
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defeated Le Pen with an overwhelming percentage (82.20%).
86
This defeat revealed that 
there is a need for transformation both on party rhetoric and party program that was 
clearly understood by Marine Le Pen as the developments aftermath of this election 
shows. Even though Marine Le Pen attempted to make a shift in party rhetoric and party 
program in which she seems to be successful according to last European election results 
proved, there are two aspects that need to be take into consideration while analyzing the 
rise in FN‟s votes. Firstly, as academic commentators points out, although it might 
seems as a de-radicalization of party program at some policy areas
87
, a deeper analysis 
on party program shows that it is not a total transformation or softening of party 
program especially in immigration policies but rather a re-framing of same policies to a 
limited extent and a successful representation of such changes. Secondly, the increase in 
the votes of FN must not be considered as the sole success of Marine Le Pen‟s 
representation in a new style since there are several accounts that should be taken into 
consideration on analysis of rise in the right- wing votes in general, such as change in 
order of the European societies, changing economic conditions and increasing concerns 
relatedly. On this point, there will be a deeper investigation at the end of this chapter 
through broader lenses.  
 
 Above-mentioned changes in the party program and rhetoric, which are 
successfully represented by Marine Le Pen worth to mention in order to create a better 
understanding on through a question; is that really the change in party program that 
shifted former preferences of voters who supported FN in last European elections? 
Besides, latest party program of FN is necessary mention in order to see on which 
accounts that FN is considered as right wing or populist or even far right political 
party.
88
 A relevant debate on classification of FN will be introduced at the end of this 
part reserved for French case. The latest party program introduced in 2012 by Marine Le 
Pen, purposed a change in Nationality code in which party suggested that the Nationality 
code should not gave right to get citizenship through residence for non-Europeans. It 
also purposed that current arrangements that allow illegal immigrants to regularize must 
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also abolished and additionally, medical aid for immigrant should also be removed.
89
 As 
Ivaldi mentioned, Le Pen stated her stance clearly through advocating that there should 
taken several measures in order to take French Nationality back from the naturalized 
citizens who are convicted of crime once.
90
On law and order subjects, Marine Le Pen‟s 
suggestions seems remained the same as the measures that she advocated were once 
advocated by her father. FN adopted a strategy of “tolerance zero” on law and order 
topic, which offers creation of 40,000 new prison places with restoration of police 
forces. For this offer, Shields comments that this suggestion was an attempt that claims 
to intensify fight against Islam and a strong sign of party‟s position as being opposed to 
immigration, multi-culturalism and Islamization of France.
91
From all of these proposals, 
it would not be mistaken to say that party rhetoric is still can be considered as 
discriminatory, exclusionist and obviously not in favor of egalitarian principles. Besides, 
both academic and non-academic commentators agree that there cannot be seen a real 
transformation in the core values and principles of FN whereas there is a successful re-
introduction of same ideals in a softer and plausible way. As Shields successfully 
explained, Le Pen legitimizes her party‟s “discriminatory policy agenda as a defense of 
liberal values and personal rights”.92 
 
 Apart from FN‟s agenda considering social issues, the party also adopted an 
agenda covering economic issues that also strongly emphasized by academics. The main 
emphasis is on the agenda‟s left-leaning position in which Le Pen created a shift towards 
anti-capitalist discourse. Anti-capitalism and social welfare is considered as major topics 
that should be taken into re-consideration in favor of the population who cannot get 
enough protection from current governments according to new political agenda.
93
 In the 
current context, Betz also stated that new agenda adopted such position within 
nationalist perspective in which through only re-gaining the national sovereignty, the 
French citizens be protected against the devastating effects of globalization.
94
 On the 
                                                        
89
Font National, 2012a. 
90
Ivaldi, Gilles, ―Permanenceset e ́volutions de l‘ide ́ologiefrontiste.‖ In Le Front national. 
Editions del‘Universite ́ de Bruxelles, 2012, pp.99. 
91James Shields, ―The Front National: Fromsystematicoppositiontosystematic Integration?‖. 
Modern & Contemporary France, 22(4), 2014.pp.501. 
92
Ibid., pp.502 
93
Hans- Georg Betz, ―Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe‖.St. Martin‘s Press, 
1994.pp.8 
94
Ibid., pp.8 
28 
 
same account, Shields also puts emphasis on this increasing demand of social and 
economic protection from population that FN attempts to hold on for increasing its 
support. Another comments on the economic side of this FN‟s policy shift, made by 
Evans and Ivaldi that they asserted in the context of an economic crisis and popular 
dissatisfaction about mainstream political parties, right-wing parties such as FN will 
likely to increase its vote capacity even further.
95Another commentary on FN‟s possible 
victory for the last European Elections written by Partusot&Rittelmayer in February, 
states that FN election campaign successfully turned its face to European issues rather 
than national problems in order to keep that doubtful environment about EU among 
voters since Le Pen realized that the effects of economic crisis in Europe and 
unpopularity of political leaders might help her for the victory.
96
 The Authors also 
mentioned that European Elections would occur in an environment of slowly developing 
economic conditions with high unemployment levels, which actually helped Le Pen in 
both campaign period and elections. Along with these facts, according to public opinion 
polls, most of the correspondents of a survey on the effects of European Union on 
France have a tendency towards answering this question with negative answer. 
According to the results, most of the correspondents think that European Union has a 
negative effect on France‟s current situation 97which also helped Marine Le Pen to 
arrange her party‟s campaign discourse towards criticism of European Union that was 
already existent among the population.   
 
 If we turn directly back to the success of FN during the last European elections, 
media coverage on National Front and especially Marine Le Pen could give further 
information about FN‟s general portrait. Reuter‟s news covered the story with the title 
that mentioning FN as far-right party in which they also put emphasis on party‟s anti-
immigrant character through stating “ it was the first time that anti-immigrant, anti- EU 
party had won a nationwide elections in its four-decades history”. In the same news 
coverage, authors also put Le Pen‟s comments after her victory in which she declared 
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that the French society no longer desire to be governed by those authorities who are not 
elected. As many other academic and non-academic commentators assumed, Reuter‟s 
authors also highlighted that FN is especially popular among working class voters and 
among relatively younger population just because they are dissatisfied about mainstream 
political elite since the mainstream political elite could not be able to understand the 
general concerns of population about increasing immigration, crime rates and decreasing 
living standards
98
. According to The Economist news, FN portrayed as a populist party 
and the latest victory of FN created “shock” in France. Authors of this article stated that 
FN‟s latest victory in European Elections is remarkable for several reasons. Firstly, FN 
pushed the center right UMP in the second place which supposed to be the main 
opposition party. Secondly, FN also “crushed” Hollande‟s socialist party who emerged 
as the third party in elections. Lastly, with such results FN quadrupled its previous score 
in European Elections in 2009. While The Economists‟ authors‟ wording tends to 
underestimate FN‟s victory through claiming that Le Pen‟s only major action is to 
“irritate and undermine the mainstream parties” however, several polling agencies states 
that; FN‟s support is increasing99. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Denmark: Danish People’s Party  
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 One of the most prominent topics among election results was the case of the 
success of Danish People‟s Party (Dansk Folkeparti)100 that emerged as the first party 
among its rival parties in Denmark. DPP gained 26.60% of the vote share during the 
2014 European Elections while the biggest two parties of Denmark; Social Democrats 
(Socialdemokraterne)
101
which gained 19.10% of the vote share and Venstre
102
 
(DenmarksLiberale Parti) with 16.70% of the vote share became second and third 
parties.
103 DPP‟s success in last European elections represented by newspapers and 
academic commentators as rise of the right wingin Denmark (reference), which was an 
already existent trend in the country such as in France and Austria. Additionally, again 
both academic and non-academic sources put relevant effort to explain about the 
importance of this rise and causes of this rise for several accounts.  
 
Briefly, due to the fact that DPP is relatively young political party in comparison 
to other political establishments in Denmark, although it is a split from old political 
party (Progress Party), DPP succeeded to increase its votes consistently in recent period, 
which makes it worth to analyze in deeper perspective. Along with this reason, academic 
researches also put emphasis on Denmark‟s country profile through considering the 
economic conditions, life standards, and especially immigration rates with other several 
factors which are making DPP‟s increasing support more unexpected. Before 
elaborating on DPP‟s European election success and causes accordingly, there will be a 
brief chapter* on the party‟s general profile as following.  
 
Danish People‟s Party (Danish Folkeparti) established in 1995 as a split from 
Progress Party by Pia Kjærsgaard who was also a member of Progress Party in 
Denmark.
104
According to statistics, DPP has steadily increased its support by years 
beginning from its foundation, which made the party one of the largest party in 
Denmark. Since the year 2011, DPP kept its position as the third in national results 
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while having increased number of seats in parliament.
105
In 1998 national elections, DPP 
emerged as the fifth party in results through having 7.4% of the votes that brought 13 
seats in parliament. In 2001 national elections, DPP increased its vote share to 12.0% 
and also increased its number of seats to 22.  2005 elections witnessed further increase 
in which DPP gained 1.3.3% of the votes thus its number of seats became 24. According 
to 2007 national elections, DPP gained 13.9% of the vote share. Although DPP 
experienced a slight decrease of votes during 2011 national elections (12.3%), as 2014 
European Elections proved, the party still enjoying electoral take off.
106
As in national 
results, DPP also enjoyed increased vote share in European election results as mentioned 
earlier while emerged as the first during last elections. This steady increase of DPP 
underlined by commentators as a sign of both its further potential and pushed the 
researchers to elaborate on party‟s success and causes behind this support.  
 
Although many of the newspaper commentators unintentionally agreed to 
consider DPP as a far-right political party, academic sources usually tend to classify 
DPP as right-wing Populist Party. As in earlier chapters for other European countries, 
the political party classification of DPP on a theoretical basis will be taken place at the 
end of this introduction part. Nevertheless, it is also worth to underline some of 
academic comments on party‟s affiliation at this point while having a perspective on 
party program accordingly. Backes and Moreau‟s article states that DPP member‟s 
rhetoric and party program shows several tendencies such as right-wing populism, 
national conservative discourse and euro-skepticism.
107
While J. Rydgren finds it more 
appropriate to put DPP in right-wing Populist Party categoryfor several accounts.
108
 At 
this point, it would bring a better understanding to make an analysis of party program 
since DPP‟s program draws a relatively clear frame about the party‟s position. DPP‟s 
party program puts strong emphasis on Danish culture, and cultural heritage in which 
party claims to guarantee the protection of this Danish culture against any intervention 
from other cultures so to speak. Therefore, while strengthening Danish culture, party 
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also claims to reject any kind of transformation to a multi-ethnic society with clear 
statement. Besides, it is clearly stated that, Denmark is not an immigrant society and 
there should be taken stricter measurements against further flow of immigration to 
Denmark. In a similar manner, „Denmark belongs to Danes‟ expression can be found in 
the party program, which seems like one of the prominent characteristics of right-wing 
parties. Euro-skeptic stance of the party comes from the fact that DPP‟s openly 
opposition against European Union in order not to allow Denmark “to surrender its 
sovereignty” as expressed in the party program.109Although, authors such as S. Meret 
argues that DPP‟s rhetoric towards EU has shifted over time and became more 
pragmatic stance as a result of DPP‟s position in current parliament as the third largest 
party.
110
 Expression in the DPP‟s party program showed no sign of a change over this 
time period.  
 
 Along with underlying the most prominent expressions in the party program, 
general framing of DPP in media coverage is also important to understand simply 
because of two reasons as in other right- wing parties in different countries that 
mentioned in earlier parts. On one hand, media coverage of such parties is relevant to 
see how they represented by media to society since in a broad sense; media tools are 
tended to express such parties‟ increasing success through negative intentions. Although 
there are commentators who try to elaborate on this issue through an objective 
perspective, it could be observed that general attitude in media towards such parties does 
not imply a welcoming message. On the other hand, even though the media tools 
represent this development through objective lenses, which seems not existent, their 
definitions of right-wing parties might seem narrow and mistaken so to speak on a 
theoretical basis as in other countries too. Still, media coverage on DPP is worth to 
mention at this point in order to see party‟s general image. In addition to media coverage 
on DPP, which will be taken into consideration as following, it is also significant to refer 
an opinion poll in Denmark on political party support. As a local news agency from 
Denmark reports, “far-right DPP” emerged as the largest party of the nation according to 
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an opinion poll. As news agency states, DPP gained even further support than it gained 
in national elections, which represented as “a massive increase” by the authors of the 
agency. Reliance of the poll might be open to debate and due to the fact that it is not a 
real election result, numbers might seem exaggerated nevertheless, is still constitutes an 
opinion about DPP‟s popularity. According to the opinion poll results, DPP‟s vote share 
emerges as 21.2% while DPP got 12.3% in 2011 national elections where the strongest 
two parties of Denmark Venstre and Social Democrats seems to experiencing a decrease 
in their electoral support. (As opinion poll suggests, Venstre emerges as second largest 
party with 20.9% support which gained 26.7% in 2011 national election and Social 
Democrats emerges as the third party with 19.8% that gained 24.8% in 2011 national 
elections). 
111
 
 
The Guardian news agency as in the previous one called DPP as far-right 
political party and underlined Euro-skeptic character of DPP in its news about the result 
of last European elections.
112 Whereas, RT news agency represented DPP‟s anti- 
immigration stance as the party‟s major characteristic while reporting the results along 
with mentioning DPP‟s call for deportation of refugees. The news agency reported that 
DPP is much more straightforward than any other political party in the country on the 
issues of immigration through calling Danish authorities to stop accepting refugees to 
Denmark.
113
According to The Economist news, classified DPP with other two 
Scandinavian political parties as far-right parties while asserting that these parties seems 
more popular by staying out of government. This newspaper clipping indicates that there 
is three common characteristic of Scandinavian far-right parties, which are; “a deep- 
rooted suspicion towards immigrants and European Union, a taste for old- fashioned law 
and order and a fondness for patriotic symbols”.114According to Euractive news agency, 
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Danish People‟s Party could be identified as far-right Euro-skeptic party whose 
dominant strategy is to reduce the immigration and refuge inflow to the country.
115
As 
Euractive agency mentioned, EU Business news described DPP as a far-right political 
party and underlined the anti-immigration stance of DPP while emphasizing the party‟s 
call for tightening the border control regime
116
.  
 
For the case in Denmark, the rise in the support for DPP seems more unexpected 
when the country profile taken into consideration. Academic researches on this case 
points out such characteristics of Denmark while examining the success of DPP as 
mentioned earlier. According to Backes and Moreau, Danish political system could be 
considered as settled and stable while democracy is well functioning. As an opinion poll 
proves, %90 of the Danish population is satisfied with this well-functioning system. 
Besides this fact, Backes and Moreau also underlines that economic situation in 
Denmark is well, unemployment rates are considered as low (2014: 6.4%)
117
, inflation is 
under control and as of 2014;the ratio of immigrants to total population is 11.5% which 
seems small according to the authors. As well as economic conditions, social security 
system of Denmark works flawless and trade unions are accepted as strong social actors 
as two Authors indicated.
118
According to this extensive work on extreme right- wing 
parties in Europe, Danish People‟s Party‟s rapidly increasing support might be the result 
of several factors. First of all, it has been observed that ideological variety of political 
parties in Denmark eroded therefore it created a decrease in the support of mainstream 
parties. It is argued that Social Democrats in the country lost its former connection with 
trade unions and working class in which DPP appeared as an alternative political 
establishment that presents a different political option to those classes. Secondly, 
starting from 1990‟s Danish society has become more anxious about the future of 
welfare state mostly because of increasing levels of immigration to country, which also 
became a highly popularized topic. DPP appeared as the only party who seems 
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concerned about this immigration issue for a long time. Besides, still DPP seems like the 
only political party who is advocating that there should be taken stricter measures 
against possible high levels of immigration. Therefore, DPP became more popular 
among voter population through such statements and policy proposals. 
119
 
 
Above-mentioned causes on the raising success of DPP especially in recent years 
that are suggested by two academics might constitute a seminal perspective about the 
reasons behind this rise however, these causes might seems insufficient to understand 
the whole picture. What is meant by the whole picture is basically refers to a broader 
perspective on the rise of right-wing parties in recent years especially in western 
European countries through considering the changes in the social structure of these 
societies in question, if this change is existent, and the changes in economic conditions 
which are interconnected with social changes consequently. Therefore, further chapters 
will be dedicated to understand such fundamental causes that might result in rise of 
right- wing parties in the countries that are examined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4. The Netherlands: Party for Freedom 
 
The elections results came from the Netherlands was not an exception 
considering the rise of far right parties in Europe. Although the far right party in 
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Netherlands PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid) Party for Freedom
120
 witnessed a slight 
decrease of its votes in comparison to last European Elections, the popularity of the 
party is still high and its position in national parliament is still strong. Besides the 
popularity of the PVV among society as a far right party, the party leader Geert Wilders 
enjoys a high degree of media attention partly because of his controversial; mostly 
xenophobic and Islamophobic statements. 
 
In the last European Elections in 2014, PVV gained 13.32% of the votes and 
emerged as third largest party in the Netherlands. 
121
 In comparison with European 
Elections in 2009, in which PVV gained 16.97% of the votes and emerged as the second 
largest party
122
, the party has lost 3.65% of its votes however, as mentioned above PVV 
continue to keep its position as the third largest party in national parliament. According 
to national election results, the popularity of the party could not be underestimated even 
if the party has a swinging vote share. The rising support in question comes from the 
fact that; in 2006 parliamentary elections PVV could gain only 5.69% of the votes 
whereas in 2010 parliamentary elections the party was able to raise its votes to 15.45 per 
cent. 
123
 In the 2012 parliamentary elections PVV again witnessed a decrease in its vote 
share while having 10.08% of the votes, still it is the third largest party in 
parliament.
124In the national context, PVV‟s rise must be taken into consideration since 
the political system in the Netherlands is stable where three big parties; social democrat 
PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid), Christian democrat CDA (Christen Democratishe Parti) 
and liberalVVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie)
125
shared the power in 
national parliament interchangeably. In such system, PVV‟s success particularly in 2010 
elections appears as a more important occasion in which Koen Vossen underlines that 
PVV was the only party that could benefitted from 2010 parliamentary elections through 
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increasing its vote and states that PVV became an important player in the process of 
establishing a new coalition government. 
126
 
 
 
According to Merijn Oudenampsen, it is possible to talk about a substantial 
increase in the support for right-wing populism since 1990‟s in which a remarkable rise 
became more apparent with 2010 parliamentary elections that the author defines this rise 
as a „new climax‟ for the political system.127 Oudenampsen underlines this development 
particularly since this climax gave a relative power to PVV as a coalition partner where 
VVD and CDA formed a minority government that needs support of PVV in order to 
maintain parliamentary majority.
128
Since then, right-wing populism which is represented 
by PVV in respective country, slowly included in the mainstream politics as an accepted 
feature. At this point it could be argued that PVV‟s identification as a party that 
positioned itself in the margins of political system might be mistaken within the whole 
context.  
 
On the classification of the Party for Freedom, academic sources usually tends to 
consider PVV as right-wing populist party since PVV includes some of the common 
characteristics of right-wing populist parties although party programme consists several 
expressions that could be labeled as far right statements particularly about the subjects 
of immigration and protection of culture.
129
As in the other cases, media representation of 
PVV does not follow a particular way about defining the party in which variety of news 
agencies labeled PVV as far-right and even sometimes defines as extreme right party 
however identification by media tools would be mistaken since for most of the cases, 
these sources does not construct their discourse on the basis of academic arguments. 
Whereas, it is still worth to mention about news agencies‟ wordings while talking about 
such political establishments in order to create a broader perception on their portraits 
both in the eyes of media sources and in the eyes of society. Before talking about the 
representation of PVV in the news particularly, there are few more arguments on the 
classification of the party, which is important to understand for several reasons.   
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As mentioned in the literature examination chapter, it would be best way to put 
the parties in question into Mudde‟s general classification; populist radical right parties 
(PRRP‟s) for the motives that stated in that chapter. For the Party for Freedom, this 
classification seems relevant when the party programme and leader‟s rhetoric taken into 
consideration.  Academic commentator‟s are generally seems reluctant to define PVV as 
a part of PRRP since there is lack of common characteristics that PRRP‟s sharefor the 
case of PVV. This reluctant attitude towards putting PVV in the PRRP group comes 
from the fact that there cannot be observed a clear representation of many subjects that 
Wilders serves or depicts, which subjects are very clear in representation for other 
populist radical right wing parties. As Mudde puts in a short article, it would not be 
relevant to put PVV within the PRRP group basically for two reasons. First, PVV does 
not advocates ethnic nationalism or ethno-pluralism as other academics underlined, 
which ideology can be seen as a core value in many radical right wing parties such as 
FN in France, FPÖ in Austria and DPP in Denmark. And secondly, Mudde argues that 
Wilders should be perceived as a „mainstream politician‟ who is mostly interested in 
maximizing party‟s votes as much as possible with the claim of having more power in 
the parliament. 
130
 
 
 In the same parallel, Paul Lucardie agrees with this opinion that PVV does not 
fit in this party group that includes FN, DPP and FPÖ since these parties does not seems 
to follow same political arguments o the basis of ethno-pluralism and ethnic nationalism. 
In order to depict the differences of PVV; Lucardie called the PVV as „right-wing 
halfhearted- liberal nationalist populist‟ which not or course not an existent category for 
the political parties in question.
131
While making an analysis on the classification of 
PVV, Vossen argues that the development and the current position of PVV should be 
mention within the context of „new right‟ perspective in which he explained such 
phenomenon through central claims of this wave that are briefly; attempt to increase 
critics regarding the welfare state, and increasing the discontent considering the rising 
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numbers of Muslim immigrants in the country and a criticism towards Islam.
132
 As the 
author refers to Andrew Heywood‟s arguments at this point in which he also explains 
that PVV should be evaluated within the „new right‟ perspective, that is majorly offering 
the “preservation and restoration of old communal values and construction of morally 
evil enemy”.133 
 
 In the same article it is also argued that the possible reasons of PVV‟s or 
Wilder‟s rhetoric labeling as populist radical right wing or national populist. Vossen 
arrived that possible reasons based upon the Wilder‟s publication of an ideological 
document in in 2006
134
 in which Wilders strongly emphasis a necessity of a restoration 
of cultural and moral values in order to protect the national identity from the attack of 
„outsider cultures‟135 brought predominantly by Muslim immigrants which protection 
would maintained by discipline.
136 Therefore, Wilder‟s strong opposition against 
immigration and cultural diversity relatedly, his strong emphasis on national identity 
along with his rejection of supranational co-operation which represented through his 
clear opposition against European Union could be analyzed within the framework of 
PRRP‟s since; the main themes that used by populist radical right-wing parties (which 
are characterized as authoritarianism, nativism and populism as mentioned at the chapter 
on classification) shows strong similarities with Wilder‟s statements. At this point, it is 
also worth to mention Ben Stanley‟s argument on the populist feature of such parties in 
which he states that populism does not necessarily emerges as a distinctive characteristic 
in which populism element could be apparent in any party regardless of the ideology
137
. 
 
 The representation of PVV in the media is basically constructed upon Wilder‟s 
controversial speeches; predominantly his strict opposition against Islam and Muslim 
community in the country.  There are several news agency and scholarly articles that 
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refers the party programme and Wilders‟ speeches or publications in order to analyze his 
stance on the main subjects that party advocates. As Koen Vossen states; among the 
main themes that party uses for opposition, the anti-Islamic stance is the strongest one 
and Wilders becoming even more critical on Muslim society in the Netherlands and he 
conceptualize Islam as the basis for all problems including the youth criminality and 
high percentage of unemployment.
138
 Along with critics of Islam, party programme 
seems radical about immigration in general. It is underlined in the party programme that 
the importance of law and order in relation mostly with criminality among immigrants 
therefore Wilders suggested extra police officers in order to obtain order in society. 
Party programme offers a full ban on immigration from Islamic countries, closure of 
Islamic schools and preventing the building of more mosques in the country. Wilders 
also suggests that unemployed foreigners must find a job or go back to their own 
countries in the party programme.
139
It is also emphasized that there would be ethnic 
registration of Dutch citizens and abolishment of the first article of Dutch constitution 
which is guaranteeing the equality of all races, sexes, religions and political perceptions 
of people. 
140
 
  
 In the several news agency websites, classification of PVV varies as mentioned 
above. This is also worth to mention although these news are not part of the theoretical 
debate of classification of Party for Freedom in order to see party‟s general portrait141. 
For the theoretical debate, it is not possible to say that there is a consensus about the 
classification of PVV whether it is belong to PRRP or in another category. On one hand, 
within a general perspective on this classification of so-called „party family‟ for the 
parties in question could not reach a joint solution for labeling. For this reason basically 
it is difficult to draw a clear picture of PVV within this debate. Secondly, in a more 
detailed examination it is also not possible to put PVV in a defined group under the 
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general title of right-wing parties since the party does not necessarily share some 
common characteristics of PRRP if Mudde‟s general definition taken into consideration 
as mentioned at the beginning of this section. Yet, I humbly suggest that Wilders‟ party 
could be perceived as an example of populist radical right-wing parties since there are 
expressions that are referring to the basic three characteristics of PRRP‟s. Besides this 
debate on classification, PVV stands as an example of rise of right-wing parties in 
Europe that could gain non-negligible support both for the last European Elections and 
in parliamentary elections in respective country. While making an examination within a 
general framework on such rise, it should be underlined that parties and their central 
affiliations differs through country since the profile of respective country might not be 
similar with other European countries in question. Therefore, this fact creates variety of 
the most salient themes that parties prefer in their country. This is why PVV in the 
Netherlands taken into consideration while making an analysis on the recently „even 
more rising‟ right-wing parties in many European countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5. Finland: True Finns 
 
 Finland constitutes another example of the countries that witnessed a rise of the 
populist right-wing party mostly in recent years. True Finns (PS) in its former name, and 
The Finns as currently changed (Pressuomalaiset)
142
 increased its votes in the last 
European Elections of 2014; succeeded to gain 12.90% of the votes and emerged as the 
third largest party in the country
143
. The party also increased its support remarkably in 
                                                        
142― ―True Finns‖ Name their party ―The Finns‖ ‖, YLE Uutiset, 21 August 2011.  
http://yle.fi/uutiset/quottrue_finnsquot_name_their_party_quotthe_finnsquot/2807245 
143
 ―European Parliament: Results of the 2014 European Elections‖, EP, 2014.  
42 
 
national election especially in the last general elections, which attracted great deal of 
attention both from media and from academic commentators. In 2007 general elections 
of Finland, True Finns was able to gain only 4.1% of the overall votes and was not an 
important player in the political arena. Whereas, in 2011 general elections PS could be 
able gain 19.1% of the votes in which this great increase needed to be elaborated on 
carefully. It could be mistaken to label the PS or other parties in the Finnish parliament 
as „largest‟ ones since Finland‟s political system based on a stable multi-party system in 
which there are basically eight political parties that six of them represented in the 
parliament. In such conditions, the governmental parties are not like their counterparts in 
other countries since they are generally middle-sized parties.
144
Yet this fact does not 
change the importance of the support that PS could be able to get in recent elections 
along with the Finland‟s general decision-making culture, which is based upon the 
principle of consensus. In relation with this culture and with the existence of stable 
multi-party political system, rise of the True Finns seems a bit more unexpected in such 
a mild political environment.  
 
 For the classification issue, again there are controversial arguments about the 
True Finns‟ position in political spectrum and in media representation however, it seems 
that PS would fit in the PRRP group based upon the party‟s general attitude, party 
discourse and policy proposals. Although most of the newspapers labeled PS as far right 
party in the clippings, this labeling would not explain the position of party in theoretical 
terms. Besides, it has observed that news agencies have an attitude towards putting the 
PS in the same group that they also put Golden Dawn (XA) in Greece for example under 
the name of far right parties, which is a party (XA) that advocates violence and openly 
express itself as a neo- Nazi. This could show that it is not relevant to classify PS simply 
as a far right party without making a more detailed analysis on the party programme and 
leader‟s rhetoric.  
 
 In his work written in 2007, Herbert Kitschelt emphasized that in the countries 
such as Finland; the radical right parties could not be able to gain electoral success 
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which prediction is non-valid for the current situation.
145
But besides, Kitschelt‟s 
argument is also explains why PS‟s increase is rather unexpected. If the party 
programme taken into consideration, especially the strong emphasis on immigration 
issues, make it more interesting as a case since Finland is one of the countries that has 
low foreign citizen population and having (increasing) but low rates of immigration
146
.  
Most of the academic sources define PS as a part of the populist radical right party group 
with having lack of extremist stances on immigration through xenophobic expressions. 
However, lack of xenophobic expressions and extremist stances on immigration does not 
pull PS out of the general framework of PRRP‟s. As mentioned several times, the most 
common characteristics that PRRP‟s shares are populism, nativism and authoritarianism 
in which PS include all of these features at different levels. For the populism element, 
Shedler argues that populism emerged in very different forms through ant-feelings, 
which might be in the form of anti-elite, anti-modern, anti-establishment and so. 
147
For 
the case of PS, populism through anti-feelings constructed upon a discourse that appear 
as an opposition towards political elite, which is also existent in many of its 
counterparts. According to party leader; Timo Soini‟s rhetoric the political elite in the 
country underestimates the capacity of ordinary citizens in decision-making and 
counting them as stupid people who are all the same which Soini declared in the 2003 
election manifesto.
148
 
 
 For the nativism element, it is not possible to talk about an extremist or 
xenophobic rhetoric that Soini or party programme expresses however PS clearly 
opposes integration of Finnish culture with any other culture‟s values as Jan Sundberg 
argues. He states that PS shows no such tolerance towards non-native cultures and he 
states that although Finland is officially bilingual, True Finns‟ nationalism would not 
like to accept this fact in moderate terms and the party have a tendency towards 
exclusion of even Swedish culture as it is not seen as a natural part of the Finnish 
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culture
149 . Although Soini‟s language and attitudes do not appears in the form of 
extremism or xenophobia, party manifestos and general rhetoric opposes the increasing 
immigration into country in which they framed their policy on immigration as a 
reasonable immigration policy. On the other hand, as David Arter mentions in his 
article; according to Soumen Gollup poll established before 2008 local election, 12% of 
the respondents identify Soini as „openly racist‟ and %28 of the respondents identify 
Soini as „a racist who try to hide‟150. Therefore, the reliability of party manifesto and 
Soini‟s supposedly moderate declarations might not perceive as consistent within the 
public.   
 
 As mentioned in other sections too, media representation of the parties in 
question constitutes a rather additional information channel in order to create a better 
understanding on party‟s general attitudes. According to The Guardian News agency, 
Soini follows „a harsh anti- immigrant rhetoric‟ although academic commentators 
defines is as more moderate than its counterparts. In the same newspaper clipping, there 
is emphasis on the party manifesto in which PS states that Finns should decided on the 
immigration issues and be able choose who would come to Finland and reside in the 
country. This clipping also mentions that through such statements, Soini and his party 
creates an image of „enemy‟ in which the immigrants are in the role of this enemy for 
most of the cases including the populist radical right parties. 
151
Social Europe news 
agency makes an analysis on the profile of party leader; Timo Soini and introduce him 
as the charismatic leader and anti-establishment advocate.
152
 In the same clipping it is 
stated that the True Finns follows a policy of welfare chauvinism
153
, which considered 
as a common characteristic between PRRP‟s.  
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 The main motivation behind taking True Finns case into this research is to show 
examples from different countries as much as possible in order to cerate a broader 
perspective on the nature of these PRRP‟s within the country context. As mentioned in 
earlier sections, it is not possible to create concrete measurements or strict 
characteristics for such parties in which they might differ according to conditions of 
their respective countries. Although there are common features that these parties share, 
their major claim of such parties is to respond the significant demands, which they 
assume that are expressed by their respective societies. Thus, in relation with the 
salience of particular issues in the countries that parties emerged; their form or style of 
discourse could vary in accordance with the nature of political system. True Finns 
included into this category; PRRP‟s according to many scholars as emphasized in this 
section although the party identified in different terms by news agencies. But after all, 
True Finns constitutes an example of populist radical right parties through its 
programme and through party leader‟s rhetoric.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6. Greece: Golden Dawn 
 
 Greece was another country that witnessed an increase in the radical right party 
in the last European Elections of 2014. Golden Dawn (XA) was able to gain 9.39% of 
the votes and emerged as the third largest party in this election
154
. Besides its 
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considerable success in the European Parliament elections, Golden Dawn was also able 
to gain 6.97% of the votes in Greek Legislative Elections in 2012 in which the party had 
only 0.29% of the votes in 2009 elections
155
. The rise of Golden Dawn was not exactly 
occurred under the same conditions in comparison with many other European countries 
and the classification of XA is not the same with the parties that mentioned in this thesis 
however, both academic and nonacademic commentators take this development into 
consideration while making analysis on this subject with Greece‟s particular conditions. 
Golden Dawn mostly identified the violent protests and attacks which put the party not 
in populist radical right party group but rather makes the party an extremist, far right or 
neo-Nazi type as many sources indicate
156
. Although example of Golden Dawn shows 
great deal of differences among other right-wing party analyses, there are several 
scholars that take this issue within the framework of rise of right-wing parties
157
. 
Therefore, as an example of an openly extremist or far right party, Golden Dawn might 
be proper example to examine.  
 
 Golden Dawn is not a new party that emerged as a result of the Greece‟s 
outbreak of sovereign debt crisis in the claim of responding the increasing discontent in 
society but this financial crisis has a huge impact in the rise of the party. Golden Dawn 
established in 1983 by Nikos Michaloliakos who is the current leader of the party with a 
nationalist motivation as stated in the party manifesto
158
. It is noted that Golden Dawn 
stayed in the margins of political system in Greece until the emergence of recent 
financial crisis
159
. As mentioned above, the party could not reach any particular electoral 
success until the local elections that took place in 2010. Besides the fact that Golden 
Dawn and its members associated with violent protests and violent attacks especially 
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against immigrants in country
160
, the party leader and other members rejects the labeling 
of party as National Socialist or neo-Nazi. However, it is apparent that both party 
manifesto and speeches of party members reflect racist affiliations in several cases. 
According to party documents, as Ellinas states in his article on Golden Dawn; there is 
an emphasis on such expressions, which claims the people born from a particular „race‟ 
naturally. Besides as the party member Elias Panogiotaros stated; Greek „race‟ has exact 
standards
161
. It might be argued that these expressions of party manifesto and party MP‟s 
could be interpreted in the scope of the common features of populist radical right party 
family; nativism or nationalism as scholars explained however, these two features does 
not include the ideologies which has a biological emphasis on identification of the 
nation
162
. Besides, it was mentioned several times that the current conceptualization of 
such parties as „radical‟ or „far‟ right, does not necessarily creates a linkage with the old 
type of extremist, radical or far right parties which refers basically the use of violence as 
an extremist element that preferred as a tool for political success. Whereas, Golden 
Dawn‟s extremism element comes mostly from its tendency towards use of violence as 
tool for political achievement, which does not constitute a common characteristic of 
PRRP‟S.  
 
 Besides, as mentioned in earlier sections, current PRRP‟s „populism‟ feature 
emerges through several forms of anti-feelings; anti-establishment, anti-elite and so. In 
order to identify a party as anti-system, Mudde refers to Sartori‟s definition of anti-
system
163
 in which the party in question must underestimate the legitimacy of the 
existing government and the political system that government operates. At this point, 
Mudde underlines a difference between the „new‟ PRRP‟s and the „old‟ ones in which 
the new radical right wing parties do not construct their positions as anti-system in 
which they do not necessarily rejects liberal democracy as the political system although 
they make criticism some of the features of liberal democracy. For the case of Golden 
Dawn, they construct their rhetoric, if it would be taken within the populism framework, 
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as anti-system clearly. Ellinas points out that, in the party manifesto Michaloliakos 
defines the Greek political system as „pseudo- democracy‟ and he suggests for the party 
members to reject the political authority in the country including „dictatorship of 
parliamentarism‟ which could be the proof of their position as anti-system where this 
expressions creates the difference between the current PRRP‟s in question and Golden 
Dawn. 
164
 
 
 On the subject of immigration, besides the fact that the party associated with the 
violent attacks against immigrants in country, the party manifesto draws a clear stance of 
opposition towards increasing immigration. As party manifesto states, Golden Dawn 
proposes to deportation of all illegal immigrants and suggests that illegal entry to Greece 
should be subjected to punishment in the form of social work. Besides, party suggests 
that „only people with Greek descent and Greek conscience should have political rights 
while rest should only have civil rights‟. 165As mentioned above, there are some factual 
reasons that make Golden Dawn different form its so-called counterparts in other 
European countries. Firstly, the party strongly attached to National Socialist ideology 
through constructing a basis upon racial inequality. Secondly, the party does not stand 
against the violent expressions among society; on the contrary, the party members 
participated in violent incidents as Ellinas explained. 
166
In parallel, Alexandros 
Geogopoulos explains that Golden Down uses a discourse of hatred and boost the fear in 
society thorough propagating strong xenophobic feelings. The author also explains that 
Golden Dawn could be classified as radical nationalist, homophobic or anti-Semitic and 
Golden Dawn‟s counterparts would be Ataka in Bulgaria or Jobbik in Hungary167. 
 
 As many academic and non-academic sources explains the rise of extreme right 
in Greece did not emerge under the same conditions in comparison with other European 
countries. The foreign debt crisis made huge impacts on the society and in political 
system relatedly. This financial crisis in Greece along with several effects gave impetus 
to the realignment of the Greek electorate as Ellinas argued, since crisis affected the 
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whole political nature in the country
168
. Greek electorate lost its trust to existing 
government during the crisis in which traditional parties who shared the power lost their 
credibility in the eyes of the electorate, which also resulted in strongly decreasing levels 
of loyalty of electorate to their general preferences in political arena. Additionally, 
mostly as a result of foreign debt crisis, a wave of de-legitimization of Greek political 
system emerged within the society in the past few years. This de-legitimization process 
found its representation in the violent, non-violent protests that erupted several times, in 
which the existing politicians insulted publicly.
169
Financial crisis in Greece was not the 
only reason that pushed the impetus behind the rising of Golden Dawn. As mentioned in 
academic sources, Greek society lost its trust to existing political authorities and 
discredited them in relation with the increasing levels of concerns about immigration. 
Society put the blame on political authorities, as they could not control the inflow of 
illegal immigrants, which is increasing year by year where Greece basically emerged as 
a hub country, which is seen as a way to enter into European Union by immigrants
170
.  
 
 The conditions as mentioned above benefitted the rise of Golden Dawn in recent 
elections as they pretend to respond newly arising demands from society that are 
emerging in harsher forms as a result of the circumstances mentioned above. Besides, 
academics also give credit to „chronic dysfunction‟ of Greek state that affected the de-
alignment of Greek electorate long with economic crisis and increasing concerns about 
immigration issues
171
.  Because of all above situated reasons, the feelings of fear and 
insecurity within Greek society have risen especially among unemployed, low paid, 
unskilled and young population who are tend to be more furious upon this insecure 
environment which also emerged as a fertile ground for Golden Dawn in order to take 
the role as the protector of insecure population. 
172
 
 
 The inclusion of Golden Down in this attempt to analyze about the rise of 
populist radical right wing parties preferred with a motivation of increase the variety of 
such parties in order to widen the perspective on rising right-wing parties, while taking 
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not only the mainstream ones within the framework of PRRP‟s but also extreme ones 
which could be to increase its support for recent European Elections and in national 
election such as Golden Dawn. Although Golden Dawn predominantly benefitted from 
the controversial events and the change in political system respectively, it would be 
mistaken the underestimate its vote since it is not possible to make a precise foresight 
whether Golden Dawn will increase its votes in future or not in relation with changing 
conditions in Greece. It is also important to remind an above-mentioned point on such 
rise that the political environment and developments in respective countries have huge 
effects on the emergence and therefore increase or decrease of these right-wing parties 
which creates the major differences between the parties in question.  
 
Next Chapter will address the theoretical explanation about radical right parties 
particularly about their existence in the current context.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    CHAPTER 3  
 
Theoretical Explanations of the Rise of The Populist Radical Right Wing Parties 
 
 There is a wide range of literature devoted to understand the rise of the populist 
radical right wing parties in different European countries; that have been constructed 
upon finding the possible reasons behind this rise in very broad framework. About such 
reasons, there are central theories that are referred by nearly all of the academic 
researches in order to define the development process of these parties in question within 
a historical perspective and analyze this process through considering the possible 
51 
 
reasons in relation with societal, political and economic changes. Most of this literature 
put strong emphasis on post-industrial phenomenon, which will be taken into 
consideration in following parts, as the most relevant theory that might explain the 
overall process in this context since, previous theories that tried to explain the rise of 
right-wing parties has lost their ground and became deficient for current conditions. As 
Mudde states; the theories that attempt to explain this rise through changing economic 
conditions in which it is emphasized that the increase in the support for right-wing 
parties emerges as a following process of economic crisis in different countries, is 
lacking „empirical scrutiny‟. He supports his argument by pointing out the last European 
Elections in which; in only one of the bailed out countries electoral support for radical 
right wing increased. 
173
What was also apparent in the last European Elections is that the 
rise of radical right wing parties is not directly connected with the rising social or 
political problems in variety of European societies but rather the essence of these 
„problems‟ are actually not problems but basically „changes‟ in the respective societies 
which ended up in creating wide range of impacts on political and cultural arena.  
 
 What was Daniel Bell once suggested in 1973; there will be political 
developments with respect to change in the societies that will go beyond socialism, 
which will mark by the emergence of post-industrial society after long series of 
developments. He argued that the emergence of post-industrial society is connected and 
emerged as a reflection of change in industrial structure in which the social structure or 
several European countries was expect to change fundamentally. This transformation to 
post-industrial society will have impacts on the political system too. As such 
transformation happens, there will also emerge new necessities, which could not be 
satisfied with old ways of politics accordingly.
174
 In parallel with Bell‟s theory, Ronald 
Inglehart explained that transformation which Bell mentioned, with a slightly different 
focus. Inglehart argued that this major transformation in advanced industrial societies 
develops in connecting with the value change in such societies. As Inglehart suggests, 
the value preferences of Western public have been shifting towards post-materialist 
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values in which public concerns overwhelmingly emphasize the quality of life, freedom 
of expression or autonomy issues rather than previous materialist demands such as 
economic well being. 
175
 Therefore, the change in the value structure would eventually 
resulted in the transformation of social structure as many of these scholars suggested, 
which will reflect as also a change in the political structure too. As new post-materialist 
values become more salient, political establishments would respond them through 
change on one hand. On the other hand, the traditional cleavage structure would also 
eventually have to change as a result of such social transformations in Western publics 
in which, this shift in the traditional cleavage structure would also affect the traditional 
political party cleavages as long as the political party differences was once shaped as a 
reflection of societal divisions. In this respect, structural transformation in societal level 
will give birth to emergence of new political structure and new political movements that 
are to respond new demands of publics.  
 
 Many of these grand theories tried to explain the rise in the radical right-wing 
populism through connecting this rise with structural transformation of Western 
societies in which the new structure called „post-industrial‟ and the value change in 
respective societies called „post-materialism‟. With respect to such argument, Inglehart 
once stated that the rise of radical right-wing parties emerged as a manifestation of 
“fundamentalists who correctly perceive that many of their central norms rapidly 
eroding”.176This erosion of central norms therefore, created a renewal among the radical 
right-wing parties in which they could pretend like they are the ones who would 
successfully understand the new demands from society while using the main themes of 
that current context which was not existed until than, as a mean for political success. 
The strong emphasis of immigration and strong resistance to multi-culturalism are the 
central subjects that new radical right-wing parties prefer to scratch in this context. In 
parallel, Hans-Georg Betz argued that this new radical right could be perceived as “ very 
much like the authoritarian materialist counterpart to left-libertarian post-materialism on 
the new politics axis defined by a new political conflict over the question which values 
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will ultimately prevail in post-industrial age”. 177Ignazi added one more aspect to such 
theoretical debate while referring to political developments occurred especially after 
1980‟s. Betz explained these developments as “ the political climate of 1980‟s was 
characterized by disenchantment with the major social and political institutions and deep 
distrust in their workings, the weakening and decomposition of electoral alignments, and 
increased political fragmentation and electoral volatility” 178  that such developments 
gave rise to emergence of new issues among society such as growing awareness of 
environmental destruction which created a protest wave; growing sensitivity towards 
equality of minorities and woman which gave birth to new demands from politics. All of 
these changing dynamics was expected to benefit and create a change in the left of 
political spectrum as Betz noted. 
179
What Ignazi added to this debate was his emphasis 
on the developments occurred in the right of the spectrum with respect to above-
mentioned process. He stated that “it could be said that the Greens and ERP‟s (extreme 
right parties) respectively, the legitimate and unwanted children of new politics; as the 
Greens coma out of silent revolution, the ERP‟s derive from a reaction to it as „silent 
counter-revolution‟ ”. 180 
 
 Above-mentioned theories constructed with the claim of creating a relevant and 
reasonable framework in order to understand the rise of „new‟ right in the political 
arena. Susi Meret argues on this subject that these major structural transformations that 
changed the society and politics accordingly, emerged mostly as a result of globalization 
and advancement of industrial countries. Therefore she states that all of these 
processes“favored the decline of traditional established parties; resulted emergence of 
new groups of voters who are more generally inclined to listen to political messages 
emphasizing problems of rising immigration, crime rates, increasing cultural and 
religious diversity and growing independence of labor markets”.181Besides, she also 
emphasized that the growing importance of identity and cultural value positions 
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emerged in relation to growing diversity in cultural sphere, are also became determinant 
in the party positions in the right spectrum. 
182
 
  
 All of these theories on the growing role of radical right wing populism more or 
less touches upon the same processes in Western societies, which resulted in the 
emergence of new issues and new alignments in political arena. As mentioned earlier, 
the major transformation of Western societies brought or boosted mostly by growing 
intensity of globalization and advancement of industrial countries. The wide-range 
consequences of these two important factors found a reflection in the political arena, 
which seems strongly connected with the rise of populist radical right parties. Karapin 
argues that both of these processes, created a basis for „political alienation‟ in which 
established traditional political parties could not be able to respond such evolvements as 
quick as possible. Therefore, a general dissatisfaction about such traditional political 
parties emerged in societies in which these political establishments could not present 
reasonable solutions to increasing problems such as corruption, immigration, crime, 
economic growth and unemployment respectively. This impotence of traditional 
political parties gave rise to feelings of protest among populations where radical right 
turned this situation into an advantage for them and „exploited‟ the dissatisfied 
electorate
183
. He argues that Betz and Kitschelt
184
based their theories on the rise of 
radical right wing in a same parallel. As Karapin basically summarizes these two 
scholars‟ debate on this issue as emphasizing that the potential reasons behind the rise of 
radical right might be apparent when both traditional parties and challenging political 
parties (radical right parties) taken into consideration. The responses of these both types 
of parties; to current social and political changes was able to alter conditions of electoral 
competition. 
185In Karapin‟s argument, he also emphasize about the additional reasons 
that might gave rise to radical right parties as; “these causes include the breakdown of 
traditional cleavages and rise of issue voting, the crisis of welfare state, perceived failure 
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of established parties to resolve major problems such as unemployment, corruption, 
crime and immigration”. 186 
 
 Along with above-mentioned theories which tried to based their arguments on 
the so called post-industrial phenomenon that emphasizing the major structural changes 
in western societies mostly as a result of globalization and advancement of industrial 
countries as an explanation for the rise of radical right wing parties; there is also an 
elaborate work of Jens Rydgren in which he tries to alter the post-industrial phenomenon 
through widen its perspective with his theoretical framework. He basically based his 
argument upon emergence of a new „master frame‟ that current PRRP‟s use in order to 
increase their electoral support.
187
As other scholars argued, Rydgren also states that 
extreme, radical, far right parties has lost their legitimate ground especially after the 
Second World War as they promoted the most extreme stances such as biological 
racism, anti-Semitism during that period and all of these positions that they‟ve once 
advocated have been stigmatized. 
188
The innovation of new master frame in his theory 
could be able to gave a new legitimate ground for extreme right-wing parties in which 
he explains that this new master frame:  
“Combining the ethno-nationalism based on „cultural racism‟ (ethno-pluralist doctrine) 
and a populist (but not anti-democratic) anti-political establishment rhetoric, the extreme 
right was able to free itself from enough stigma to be able to attract voter groups that 
never would have considered voting for an „old‟ right-wing extreme party promoting 
biological racism or anti-democratic stances”. 189 
 
 Rydgren argues that the theories (post-industrial phenomenon), whichfocus on 
macro-structural transformations mainly, could be less satisfactory when all of the 
countries that this new party family emerged taken into consideration. Simply because, 
there are exceptional cases which does not fit with the post-industrial phenomenon in 
explaining the rise of radical right parties therefore, he argues that scholars should seek 
for a „causal mechanism‟ that can be applicable for all countries in question, rather than 
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creating grand universal theories for this case.
190
Along with the innovation of the new 
master frame, Rydgren also emphasize that this master frame is not enough to explain 
whole process that radical right emerged within. He strongly supports that the expanding 
of political opportunities during this process also allow these parties in question to 
increase their electoral support which constitutes a very important aspect since with lack 
of such opportunities, PRRP‟s would not be able represent and spread their ideologies 
through this master frame. While explaining these new chances, the relation between the 
outcomes of macro-structural changes and new political opportunities must be taken into 
consideration where, without the existence of outcomes of such structural changes, new 
political opportunities might not emerge within this context.  
 
Rydgren argues that the emergence of new radical right parties along with 
expanding political opportunities resulted basically in for outcomes; a) PRRP‟s 
increased the variety of interests of certain groups, b) these parties emerged in a context 
that some voter groups becoming more alerted about the threats to their identity through 
increasing diversity in which PRRP‟s could easily exploited such feelings, c) PRRP‟s 
boosted the already existent discontent among society about politicians and established 
political parties since these political actors could not be able to solve „anomalies of post-
industrial society‟, d) PRRP‟s benefitted from a situation in which voter groups started 
to understand that old type of frames are not effective any more in understanding the 
reality of that day
191
. The author states that all of these conditions together, fueled the 
emergence and development of radical right wing parties and created new spaces for 
these parties to establish their ideologies including ethno-nationalism, xenophobia and 
cultural racism within a new framework along with facilitating from existing discontent 
in society
192
. Within this debate, it is not possible to mention all of the political 
opportunities that Rydgren analyzed in detail however in a brief summary; the political 
opportunities that the author emphasized are; realignment and de-alignment processes
193
 
in which he explains the changing preferences of voters; degree of convergence in 
political space
194
 through emergence of new party families and radical right parties in 
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this framework; agenda setting and politicization of new issues
195
 in which Rydgren 
explains how new issues are posited as major themes and politicized by these radical 
parties; and availability of new potent master frame
196
 which is the major point of 
Rydgren‟s theory.   
 
For the master frame theory that Rydgren constructed in order to create a causal 
mechanism that would be applicable to all examples in which the radical right parties 
could emerged and flourished; he argues that the party family could be able to advocate 
their ideologies that includes extreme stances on nationalism, xenophobia, ethnic 
discrimination and others, through only innovation of this new master frame which 
reflected these old-fashioned and mostly extreme ideologies as new and moderate ones 
which are established by radical right parties as these stances responding the newly 
emerged demands and discontent among societies. The new master frame that Rydgren 
talks about is a combination of „ethno-nationalism, cultural racism, and anti-political 
establishment populism‟ in which he explains the ethno- nationalism and cultural racism 
elements within the ethno- pluralism doctrine that advocates; cultural values and 
national characteristics are unique to particular nations and they should be kept separate 
without mixing with other cultural values. According to this doctrine; the superiority or 
inferiority of particular cultures is not necessarily promoted, it is just emphasized that 
cultures are separate and unique entities, which should stay in that form
197
. Although 
ethno-pluralism doctrine might seem innocent and objective to a limited extent, the new 
populist radical right parties used this frame in order to mobilize and widen their 
xenophobic and racist ideologies.  
  
As a second feature of the new master frame Rydgren stated these parties in 
question used anti- political or anti- establishment rhetoric in order to separate 
themselves from established political parties through positing themselves as the 
opposition against existing political parties with a role of a „defender‟ who seeks for the 
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interest of will of the ordinary people. Therefore, PRRP‟s are able to prevent arguments 
that label them as anti-democratic parties
198
.  
 
In this chapter, the claim is to explain the rise of populist radical right parties 
within a theoretical framework through emphasizing the existing literature‟s mostly 
debated and accepted theories on this issue. On one hand, the rise of this new party 
group analyzed by several scholars as mentioned above through post- industrial 
phenomenon. Through this framework; the emergence and rise of the populist radical 
right parties analyzed as an outcome of major transformation that most European 
societies experienced mostly because of growing intensity of globalization and its 
effects on societies and advancement of industrialization of European societies have to 
face with that has far reaching impacts in every aspect of life which is not possible to 
summarize in a limited space for this research. On the other hand, there is a second 
theoretical framework, which is mainly constructed by Jens Rydgren in order to crate a 
causal mechanism for explanation of rise of radical right wing parties within a broader 
perspective along with post- industrial phenomenon. He uses the master frame theory as 
examined above, explaining both the emergence and development process of PRRP‟s in 
current context.  
 
Searching for broader theories to understand and analyze this rise of PRRP‟s is a 
necessary process, since it is not possible; to classify all the parties that mentioned into 
the same group because of the fact, the respective countries are differing in several 
accounts. The development levels, development paths, transformation aspects in society, 
political culture, social environment and conditions are only a few of these accounts. 
Besides, it is not possible to explain the emergence of PRRP‟s in each respective 
country with same theoretical framework because of the same reasons. Although it is 
possible to cerate wider theories or causal mechanisms in order to explain the general 
picture of emergence process, again, the variety of dynamics in different countries and 
their respective effects on societies have a potential of creating exceptional cases. 
Therefore, with this chapter it is attempted to create a combination of the broadest 
theories in order to understand the emergence and development process and reasons 
behind the rise of PRRP‟S as clear as possible.  
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 In the next chapter, there will be a brief analysis on the European Elections in 
general and elections of 2014 in particular. European Elections included in this research 
as a limiting prospect as mentioned earlier with other aspects too. Some of the scholarly 
works underlines the importance of the last European elections through decreasing 
support for European Union among its citizens; European Parliament is the only organ 
that is directly elected by the European citizens and generally it becomes the target when 
it comes to direct demands of citizens. Decreasing levels of trust among European 
citizens towards Brussels emerged as an increasing relevance towards European 
Parliament elections as a voice of protest through increasing the support behind radical 
right parties. Besides, recent financial problems and instability on the possible solutions 
of this problem might also triggered the distrust in society which again reflected in the 
last European Parliament elections of 2014 in which the financial crisis and following 
instability deserves a special attention within this election context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
The 2014 European Parliament Elections 
 
 The European Elections considered as having a rather symbolic meaning in 
which EU citizens elect their representatives for European Parliament. Although the 
60 
 
Parliament has several powers in the legislative process of European Union, its general 
effects on political structure of countries is limited. With the entrance of the Lisbon 
Treaty into power, Parliament‟s position has strengthened in the decision making 
process, as an equal of the Council through introduction of the co-decision process as 
the principal decision making method
199
. The limited role of the Parliament in political 
process has been a topic of arguments by nonacademic sources in the framework of 
Parliament elections in which national parties contested. In this thesis, the importance of 
the last European Elections of 2014 could be explained in several reasons.  
 
 There is a growing importance of the role of the European Elections in my 
humble opinion not in the functional terms but rather in symbolic terms because of 
several reasons. Firstly, along with national elections, European elections appear as a 
more determinant character in following the political trends of the countries. Although it 
is not the exact parameter that show what kinds of political affiliations are rising or 
declining in respective countries, it is also important to understand the topics that are 
popular in national discussions through voter preferences for the parties that are elected 
in the Parliament. Secondly, contesting political parties are attempting the increase their 
popularity and visibility through European Elections; especially the ones that could not 
get enough electoral support in national elections. This was the case for France for the 
last European Elections in which National Front emerged as the largest party in country 
with its 24.86% vote share and gained 24 seats in parliament
200
 whereas in current 
situation, FN has only two seats in French national assembly, and two seats in Senate. 
From this fact, European Elections give a chance to such parties in order them to raise 
their visibility both in European level and in national level.  
 
 The distinctive characteristic of the last European Election of 2014 comes from 
the fact it was the first election that emerged after the financial crisis or so called 
Eurozone crisis in the European Union, which created a controversial environment 
especially the countries that hit hard by the economic problems. This is an important fact 
because; the Eurosceptic parties increased their support through using this theme while 
                                                        
199
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boosting distrust among societies. Besides the Eurosceptic parties, the populist radical 
right parties also strongly emphasized these series of financial problems and respective 
discontent in European societies in order to rise their electoral support along with using 
other significant issues such as immigration, crime, law and order which are already 
created anti-feelings and concerns among the populations in question. I humbly prefer 
European Elections as a central subject while making analyses on the increasing 
popularity of radical right wing parties since it could not be possible to analyze all 
election result for the radical right in a limited space. Therefore, I tried to draw a rather 
general picture of these parties through considering their last European election 
performance. The particular countries and respective parties that is preferred above, are 
the ones that could be able to increase their electoral support in comparison with 
previous elections. Another motivation behind this preference is again to limit this 
research within a reasonable framework while making analyses.  
 
 European Elections provided a broader level of examination for this research 
through not staying in the national boundaries for the particular parties that explained in 
earlier chapters. I assume that European Union play a major role in the agendas of 
PRRP‟s for one important reason. The most common issue that nearly all of the populist 
radical right parties prefer, as their central theme is the immigration issue and its related 
problems. The free movement of people principle within the EU countries created 
enormous opportunities for populations however, the growing discomfort among the 
„native‟ populations especially in the most developed countries of European Union as a 
result of this mobilization increased in recent years. In addition to this, the immigration 
rates from the non-membercountries are still increasing and continue to help PRRP‟s in 
several ways. PRRP‟s put strong emphasis on the immigration problems and they 
continue to politicize this issue combining it with the mobilization within EU, 
particularly taking the newcomers from southern European countries, which in turn gave 
rise to discomfort in European societies. 
 
 The countries above and respective political parties (FPÖ in Austria, FN in 
France, DPP in Denmark, PVV in the Netherlands, PS in Finland and XA in Greece) 
preferred as the examples since again it would not be possible to summarize all of the 
PRRP‟s in member countries in a limited space and perspective. Freedom Party of 
Austria (FPÖ), National Front (FN) and Danish People‟s Party (DPP) have chosen since, 
62 
 
according to several academic researches
201
 they could be considered as the best 
examples of Populist Radical Right Parties, and with no doubt, they fit with all of the 
major characteristics of this party family as Mudde
202
 states. Besides this fact, they all 
were able to increase their visibility and popularity in the last European Elections with 
their risen electoral support as statistics prove
203
. Therefore, these three parties constitute 
relevant examples of PRRP family. For the case of True Finns (PS) in Finland and Party 
for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, is not the same with above-mentioned parties. 
Although True Finns founded after split form its precedent Finnish Rural Party, both PS 
and PVV are younger parties in comparison with FPÖ, FN and DPP. The two parties PS 
and PVV could be able to found a relative electoral support for recent elections in both 
European Elections and national elections to a limited extend. The electoral increase in 
these two parties found rather unexpected by academic and non-academic commentators 
since both countries; Finland and the Netherlands, usually known with their stable 
political system, high levels of welfare and also high levels of tolerance towards non-
native populations. Whereas, increasing electoral support for both parties might refer a 
potential discomfort in the society for the issues that PS and PVV advocates, particularly 
immigration issue and related problems.  
 
 Golden Dawn within this framework constitutes a different perspective since it 
could be mistaken to consider this party as a proper example in the PRRP party family. 
The reason behind Golden Dawn‟s inclusion within this research is to both draws a 
broader picture on the limits of radical right parties and to make a comparison between 
the ones with extreme ideologies and moderate ones in this context. Golden Dawn 
labeled as extreme or neo- Nazi in several academic and non-academic sources in 
relation with its association of violent incidents in Greece as mentioned in earlier 
chapters. None of the parties in question associated with violent means and biological 
racism ideology in their respective countries, which makes the Golden Dawn as 
extremist party and different from its „counterparts‟ in other European Countries. 
Golden Dawn‟s increase is highly connected with the recent conditions of Greece 
especially after the financial crisis, however it is still important to understand the nature 
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of such political establishments that can vary in accordance with the political 
environments. Golden Dawn also mentioned in this thesis as the electoral increase of the 
party marked an important development for the last European Elections of 2014 in 
which, for the first time in its history, a neo-Nazi party could be able to elected to the 
European Parliament.  
 
Table 1.1: Vote percentage of radical right parties for the elections of 2009 and 2014. 
 
Source: European Parliament Election Results Page
204
 
 
 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 A general picture after all of this research seems more apparent in clearer lenses.  
The last European Elections of 2014 witnessed a general increase in the electoral 
support for populist radical right parties in most of the European countries also in the 
countries that are not mentioned in thesis. The rise of such parties considered as 
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important by academic commentators too.
205
 As mentioned earlier, Mudde explained 
that previous theories that are tried to explain the rise of PRRP‟s within an economic 
framework is not applicable any more since, in the most industrial and developed 
countries in the European Union also witnessed this rise in the European Elections 
which makes these economic based theories unsatisfactory for the current debates. 
Because of this fact, I tried to explain the rise of PRRP‟s for current context, with more 
relevant theories; post-industrial phenomenon
206
 and new master frame theory 
207
 in 
order to create a wider perspective on the subject.  
 
 Additionally, I tried to give different examples from the political parties that are 
included in the populist radical right party family on one hand, in order to limit this 
research and on the other, I tried to give the most relevant examples that have emerged 
and developed within different political environments while staying in the boundaries of 
this party family. About the whole research about PRRP‟s, it could be relevant to add 
some further notes. The relative rise of radical right parties does not give very clear 
messages about the future of respective political systems and power of such parties in 
the context of European Union since, it could be observed that the rise and decline of 
these parties can be rapid in relation with conditions that gave electoral support to such 
political establishments. Besides, the relative success of radical right parties is rather 
tend to be underestimated if their overall electoral success taken into consideration. 
However, their substantial increase could be important to understand since; the most 
common topics that PRRP‟s promotes in their agendas becoming more important in the 
current context such as immigration, economic implications that can derive from intense 
flow of migrants, the issues concerning identity and cultural values and controversial 
debates about multi-culturalism respectively. Therefore, the largest mainstream parties 
in national governments and European Union authorities keep these problems unsolved, 
it might create a further increase in electoral success for radical right parties. In this 
respect, both European authorities and the largest parties in national governments would 
take the increase in support for radical right parties in consideration in order to analyze 
                                                        
205
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and create relevant solutions with a motivation of preventing further controversies in 
European societies.  
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